This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 29, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that the appellant/cross-respondent (carrier) was not relieved of liability under Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify the employer pursuant to Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 409.001; that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury; and that there is no disability. In her appeal, the respondent/cross-appellant (claimant) argues that the hearing officer’s determinations regarding compensability and disability are against the great weight of the evidence.
In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the carrier urges affirmance of the challenged determinations; however, in its contingent cross-appeal, the carrier contends that the hearing officer’s determination that the date of injury is __________, is against the great weight of the evidence. The appeal file does not contain a response to the carrier’s cross-appeal from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that she worked in the laundry of the employer. The claimant testified that as she was pulling linens out of the washer on __________, she felt her right hand pop and begin to hurt. The claimant also testified that she injured herself due to repetitious work. She testified that she told her acting supervisor of the incident on the day that it occurred. In her recorded statement, the claimant’s supervisor acknowledged the claimant reported a work injury on __________.
A medical record dated June 5, 2001, from Dr. G states, and the claimant testified, that she told him she had pain and swelling in both hands for a month.
The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). That question presents a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer found that the medical records did not support the claimant’s contention of a specific injury and that the claimant has not sustained an occupational disease injury. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts have been established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision, we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse it on appeal. Pool, supra; Cain, supra.
There was conflicting evidence on the issue of date of injury. The hearing officer resolved those conflicts by giving more weight to the evidence demonstrating that the claimant first knew or should have known that her alleged injury was work related by __________. The resolution of those conflicts was a matter left to the hearing officer as the fact finder. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the hearing officer’s date-of-injury determination is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to compel their reversal on appeal. Pool supra; Cain supra.The 1989 Act generally requires that an injured employee or person acting on the employee’s behalf notify the employer of the injury not later than 30 days after the injury occurred. Section 409.001.There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination made by the hearing officer that the claimant reported her injury within the time required by the statute.
Given our affirmance of the determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that the claimant did not have disability. By definition, the existence of a compensable injury is a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, COMMODORE 1, SUITE 750
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge