This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 25, 2001. She determined that the appellant (claimant) injured her right foot, in an incident that occurred on ___________, but not her right ankle, knee, or hip.
The claimant has appealed, arguing that medical evidence proves her injuries. The respondent (carrier) responds that the decision should be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The hearing officer did not err in her determination of the scope and extent of the injury of ___________. The claimant described how her right foot was run over by a “stacker” at the employer’s place of business, and how, in reaction, she twisted against the wall where she was standing. Medical opinions that assert a sprain to the ankle, knee, and hip are based on such history, except for one opinion attributing hip and knee pain to limping. However, statements from coworkers purporting to have viewed a security videotape of the accident (which is not in evidence) dispute the history of the accident as related by the claimant.
A trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1980, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). That is not the case here, even if different inferences could be drawn, and we thus affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge