This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 1, 2001. He found that the appellant’s (claimant) injury did not result in his inability to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to his preinjury average weekly wage, i.e., he did not have “disability.” The claimant appeals this determination and the respondent (carrier) responds seeking affirmance.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
Conflicting evidence was presented concerning the claimant’s assertion of disability. He stated that he was hurt when a backhoe turned over on him; a physical therapy note documented a history of another motor vehicle cutting in front of the claimant while he was driving. The claimant’s documented medical visits were over a year apart. The claimant contended that he was unable to work at all; however, he had been observed by a surveillance team loading and unloading a rider mower from his truck and cutting the grass. The claimant contended that he happened to be observed on the one occasion he tried this. There was some evidence that he had a lumbar strain and that he had refused a light-duty offer from the employer. (Although there was no bona fide offer employment issue.)
The hearing officer stated that he did not consider the claimant to be credible. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The decision of the hearing officer is sufficiently supported by the evidence and is affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
DOROTHY C. LEADERER
1999 BRYAN STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge