This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 22, 2001. The hearing officer found that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on __________, and had disability from the injury from August 8, 2001, until the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) has appealed these determinations as contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and assails the testimony of the claimant as inconsistent and not credible. There is no response from the claimant.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The claimant contended that he had twisted his left knee while tossing some metal pieces into a melting bucket. Although he missed a day of work for medical treatment, the claimant began his claim for disability on the day he was terminated for cause, having worked up to that date even though injured. Although conflicting evidence about injury and disability was offered, the hearing officer evidently believed the medical evidence that the claimant’s knee condition could indicate a torn meniscus and further believed the claimant’s explanation as to how the knee injury prevented him from working. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). Conflicts in the evidence are the responsibility of the hearing officer to judge, considering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a whole. The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 1993, no writ). There is support in the record for the inferences drawn by the hearing officer.
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot agree that this is the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge