This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 30, 2001. The hearing officer held that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain an injury; that his date of injury would have been ___________; that he had no disability from the alleged injury; and, further, that the respondent (carrier) was discharged from liability for the claim because the claimant failed to give timely notice of his injury and did not have good cause for this. The claimant appealed and asserted that the decision was not based upon the evidence. The carrier responded that the decision is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and should not be set aside.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The claimant contended that he sustained a back injury and hernia on ___________, but worked another month, in pain, while he awaited referral by his employer to a doctor. There was evidence that he initially reported his injury to his doctor as having occurred on ___________ until the carrier asserted untimely notice. He reported the injury on ___________, the day he was laid off, through the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, however, he asserted that he had reported it earlier to his supervisor. There was evidence that although he had at one point asserted that he had a hernia, he stated when inquiry was made that it had occurred several months previously.
In summary, there was conflicting evidence offered on all three issues before the hearing officer. A trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). In this case, however, virtually every assertion made by the claimant was countered by other evidence and testimony. Those were the responsibility of the hearing officer to judge, considering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a whole. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). While there are a number of documents that assert the __________, date of injury very early on, and different inferences could be drawn as to the timely notice issue, the decision of the hearing officer is sufficiently supported on all three matters in which he decided that the evidence weighed against the claimant.
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot agree that this is the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ST. PAUL GUARDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge