This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 29, 2001. She held that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on ____________, nor did he have disability due to such claimed injury.
The claimant appeals, asserting that he was credible and has proven his case. The respondent (carrier) points out that the decision is supported by the record.
DECISION
The decision is affirmed.
The claimant contended that he sustained a shoulder and back injury while carrying some furniture for his employer. He also worked a second job. Evidence was offered to show that the claimant was told that he would be changing his shift and he responded that it would conflict with his second job, and it was not until after his vacation that he alleged he had been injured two weeks before while working for the employer. Medical evidence indicated a small lumbar protrusion and a strained shoulder.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer was faced with trying to determine if the medical conditions observed several weeks after the alleged accident resulted from an incident at work, the second employer, or during the claimant’s vacation. The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge