This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 23, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by concluding that the appellant’s (claimant) ___________, compensable injury does not include, nor extend to include, an injury to the left ankle, internal derangement of the left knee, rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder, or injury to the low back. The claimant appeals the adverse findings, asserting that the compensable injury gradually worsened, causing the fall of ___________, and the subsequent injuries. The respondent (carrier) filed a response, urging that the evidence is sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that on ___________, the claimant sustained compensable left knee sprain, right shoulder sprain, and right hip sprain injuries. The claimant contends that she did not get the treatment and diagnostic testing she should have and continued to have problems with her left knee, which on several occasions caused her to fall. The claimant testified that on ___________, while she was at home, her left knee gave out, causing her to fall to the ground and fracture her left ankle and sustain various other injuries. The designated doctor certified that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on August 7, 1997, with a zero percent impairment rating for her ___________, injuries.
A follow-on injury may itself be compensable if the subsequent or follow-on injury naturally results from the prior compensable injury. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sosa, 425 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is generally a question of fact for the hearing officer to decide. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93672, decided September 16, 1993.
Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence; we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We are satisfied that the evidence in this case sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determination that the compensable injury sustained by the claimant does not extend to the left ankle, internal derangement of the left knee, rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder, or injury to the low back.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge