This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 6, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) had disability as a result of her compensable injury from February 9 through February 27, 2001, but that she did not have disability from February 28 through November 6, 2001. The claimant appeals, contending that the hearing officer’s decision that there is no disability from February 28 until November 6, 2001, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) responds, urging affirmance. The determination that there was disability from February 9 through February 27, 2001, has not been appealed.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified and offered evidence that she was hit on the face by a door on ___________; that she suffered a cervical strain; that she went to the emergency room where she was taken off work for one day; that the next day she went to (clinic) where she was placed on restricted duty; and that she returned to work until she changed doctors and was ultimately taken off work by her treating physician on February 9, 2001. The carrier offered a report, dated February 28, 2001, of an investigator that it hired who took videotaped surveillance of the claimant on February 23, 2001, while the claimant was “driving, shopping, carrying groceries, cleaning her car, bending, stooping, and stretching with no signs of discomfort or difficulty.” The hearing officer, although confusing the date of the report, February 28, 2001, with the date of the activities, February 23, 2001, found the investigative report persuasive and determined that the claimant no longer had disability as of the date she was capable of performing those activities. Inasmuch as the disability determination to the date of February 27, 2001, was not appealed, that date has become final. There is sufficient evidence in the record, however, to support the hearing officer’s determination that there was no disability beyond February 27, 2001.
Whether there was disability presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to decide. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). We are satisfied that the evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determinations.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge