This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 31, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant/cross-respondent (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury; that the date on which the claimant knew or should have known that the injury may be related to her employment was ___________; that the claimant did not have disability; and that, as to an added issue of whether there was a timely reporting of a ___________, injury by the claimant, such issue was moot in view of the finding that the date of injury was ___________. The claimant appeals the adverse compensability and disability determinations on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, but appears to agree with the date-of-injury determination. She has attached 34 pages of documentation to her appeal, including 15 pages which were presented at the CCH (some of which are now highlighted or contain handwritten comments), and 19 pages which were not previously entered into the record. The respondent/cross-appellant (self-insured) has appealed the hearing officer’s determination of the date of injury, asserting that it should have been ___________, or earlier. The self-insured otherwise urges affirmance. The claimant submitted a response to the self-insured’s appeal.
DECISION
Affirmed.
We first note that we generally will not consider evidence that was not submitted into the record, and which is raised for the first time on appeal. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92255, decided July 27, 1992. To determine whether evidence offered for the first time on appeal requires that the case be remanded for further consideration, we consider whether it came to the appellant’s knowledge after the hearing, whether it was cumulative, whether it was through lack of diligence that it was not offered at the hearing, and whether it is so material that it would probably produce a different result. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93111, decided March 29, 1993; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). In this case, the new information submitted by the claimant consists of copies of Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 122.1(b) and 122.2(b) (Rules 122.1(b) and 122.2(b)), and articles dated July 1996 and May 1999, which appear to have been downloaded from the Internet. We readily perceive that the documentation was available to the claimant prior to the date of the CCH, had she looked for it, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. The other documents are merely duplicates of properly admitted exhibits, and the highlighting and handwritten comments do not add any material information to the case.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). The evidence was in conflict, and the hearing officer could determine that the claimant failed to prove that her injury was work related and that she had disability. As an appeals body, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer when the determination is not so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust, and we do not find it so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950456, decided May 9, 1995.
While another fact finder may not have reached the same result, the evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant neither knew or should have known that her symptoms may be related to her employment on ___________. The self-insured’s appeal on this issue is denied.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
SUPERINTENDENT
ADDRESS
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge