This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 16, 2001, with the record closing on November 19, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues before her by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of ____________, and that, because claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury, she did not have disability. Claimant appealed, asserting that the evidence establishes that she sustained a compensable injury and that she had disability. Claimant attached a November 5, 2001, letter from her treating doctor and the results of her September 4, 2001, right shoulder MRI to her appeal. The respondent (carrier) responded, objecting to the documents attached to claimant’s appeal, requesting correction of a clerical error, and generally urging affirmance.
DECISION
We affirm as reformed.
Claimant offers, for the first time on appeal, a document attached to her request for review, namely, the results of her September 4, 2001, right shoulder MRI. Generally, the Appeals Panel does not consider evidence not submitted into the record at the hearing. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92255, decided July 27, 1992. We note that at the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer inquired whether either party had a copy of this document. Both parties responded in the negative and it was not submitted into the record.
To determine whether evidence offered for the first time on appeal requires that a case be remanded for further consideration, we consider whether it came to the appellant’s knowledge after the hearing, whether it is cumulative, whether it was through lack of diligence that it was not offered at the hearing, and whether it is so material that it would probably produce a different result. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93111, decided March 29, 1993; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). We do not find that to be the case with the MRI report that claimant attached to her appeal, which was not admitted into evidence at the hearing, and yet was dated two months prior to the hearing. Because of the date of the report, it is apparent that claimant could have offered it at the hearing, so we will not consider it for the first time on appeal.
In addition to the MRI report, claimant attaches to her appeal a letter dated November 5, 2001, from her treating doctor, which states that claimant has a new injury to her right shoulder and right upper extremity. Claimant had offered the letter as an exhibit at the hearing, and the hearing officer excluded it. The hearing officer determined that the letter had not been timely exchanged and that there was no good cause for such lack of exchange. Claimant said she had received the letter on November 5, 2001, but it was not exchanged with carrier until just prior to the commencement of the hearing. Claimant notes that the hearing officer excluded the exhibit, but does not contend that this was error. We also decline to consider this letter for the first time on appeal. See Black, supra.
Both parties point to the hearing officer’s Findings of Fact Nos. 1B and 5 as containing error. In both findings of fact, the hearing officer erroneously refers to a date of April 26, 2000. The parties stipulated that the claimed date of injury was ____________, and that is the date that is used throughout the majority of the hearing officer’s decision and order. As the references to ____________, were clearly typographical errors, we reform the dates contained in Findings of Fact 1B and 5 to ____________, to conform to the evidence and the stipulation of the parties.
The parties stipulated that claimant sustained a prior compensable injury to her right upper extremity on February 6, 1996. At issue in this case is whether claimant sustained a new compensable repetitive trauma injury to her right upper extremity on ____________. Claimant testified that the compensable injury she sustained in 1996 was carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) in her right wrist only; that she had CTS release surgery on April 18, 1996; that she was able to return to work full duty without restrictions three months after the surgery; that her job is very repetitive in nature; and that her current symptoms are very different from those she experienced in 1996 because now the entire right arm is involved.
Conflicting medical evidence was presented as to whether claimant’s current right upper extremity condition is a new injury, or whether she is merely experiencing an increase in symptoms or a flare up of a preexisting condition. The hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to prove that claimant sustained a new injury. The hearing officer also determined that there was no aggravation injury. Because the hearing officer determined that there was no compensable injury, she also determined that claimant did not have disability. We conclude that the hearing officer’s determinations are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
As reformed, we affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
According to information provided by carrier, the true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ACE USA/OR and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MARCUS MERRITT
CLAIMS VICE PRESIDENT
ACE USA
6600 CAMPUS CIRCLE DRIVE EAST, SUITE 200
IRVING, TEXAS 75063.
Judy L. S. Barnes
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Terri K. Oliver – Appeals Judge