This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 6, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ____________, and that he had disability as a result of the compensable injury beginning on ____________, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The case was remanded for required carrier information and was reissued with the same decisions being made on the merits. The appellant (carrier) appeals the findings that the claimant had a compensable injury, that the date of injury is ____________, and that the claimant had disability beginning December 26 and continuing to the date of the CCH. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The carrier asserts that the employer was not open on ____________, and that the claimant must have forged his time card to show that he was at work then. Although stated as an issue, the date of injury was not the primary focus of the CCH and little, if any, testimony was presented. The assertion of forgery now raised on appeal was neither made nor developed at the CCH. The conflicting evidence as to whether the claimant did or did not work on ____________, was before the hearing officer; he evidently believed the claimant and a witness for the claimant as to the occurrence of the accident on ____________. We do not agree that the hearing officer erred in finding that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ____________.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant had disability as a result of his ____________, compensable injury beginning on ____________, and continuing through the date of the hearing. In addition to his testimony, the claimant presented medical evidence that he was taken off of work as of ____________, and remained on off-work status until July 31, 2001, when he was given a restricted duty release. The claimant testified that the employer does not have light-duty work, and that none has been offered to him. The carrier offered no conflicting medical evidence or opinions on the issue of the claimant’s disability, nor did they offer any evidence that once the claimant received his restricted duty release, he was tendered a bona fide offer of employment. The only evidence the carrier offered to dispute the claimant’s disability claim was a surveillance tape and the accompanying report.
The determination as to an employee’s disability is a question of fact for the hearing officer, and the hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). In the instant case, the hearing officer resolved the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the claimant and he was acting within his role as fact finder in determining that the claimant met his burden of proof on the issue of disability. Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the challenged determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to disturb those determinations on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH NORTH AMERICA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
GARY SUDOL
ZURICH NORTH AMERICA
9330 LBJ FREEWAY, SUITE 1200
DALLAS, TEXAS 75243.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge