This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on November 13, 2001. The appellant (carrier) appeals the hearing officer’s determinations that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury, that the carrier is not relieved from liability because the claimant timely notified the employer of the injury, and that the date of the injury is _______________, contending, essentially, that the decision is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The claimant responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
All of the issues in this case involved factual determinations for the hearing officer. The hearing officer is the trier of fact and is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). While a claimant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to prove an injury, the testimony of a claimant is not conclusive but only raises a factual issue for the trier of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91065, decided December 16, 1991. The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93426, decided July 5, 1993.
There is evidence in the record to show that the claimant was engaged in repetitive activity. Medical evidence supports the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and tennis elbow. The claimant testified that her job required repetitive activities and that the CTS and tennis elbow were a work-related injury. In a case such as the one before us where both parties presented evidence on the disputed issues, the hearing officer must look at all of the relevant evidence to make factual determinations and the Appeals Panel must consider all of the relevant evidence to determine whether the factual determinations of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941291, decided November 8, 1994. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and it does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact even if the evidence could support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). Only were we to conclude, which we do not in this case, that the hearing officer’s determinations were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust would there be a sound basis to disturb those determinations. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 224 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Since we find the evidence sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer, we will not substitute our judgment for his. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94044, decided February 17, 1994.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is NORTH AMERICAN SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge