This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on November 13, 2001. The hearing officer determined that on _____________, the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury, that the extent of the injury included the cervical and lumbar areas and related radiculopathy, and that the claimant had disability from December 5, 2000, to the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) appealed arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining compensability, the extent of injury, and disability. The claimant filed a response urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his neck and low back in the course and scope of employment on _____________. The claimant, a truck driver, testified that he injured his neck and low back when he manually lifted a trailer’s jiff dolly that had rolled away from the trailer. The hearing officer was persuaded by the medical records in evidence and the testimony of the treating doctor and the claimant’s wife that the claimant sustained a compensable injury.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant had disability from _____________, to the date of the CCH. The hearing officer was persuaded by the claimant’s testimony that he had not been able to work due to the injuries he sustained on _____________.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. A claimant’s testimony if believed alone may establish that an injury has occurred, and disability has resulted from it. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we will reverse the decision only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no grounds to reverse the findings of the hearing officer on injury or disability.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
PRENTICE HALL CORPORATION SYSTEM, INC.
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Terri Kay Oliver – Appeals Judge