This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 1, 2001. The matter was remanded in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 012090, decided October 8, 2001, and a new decision on remand was issued on November 7, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the appellant (claimant) is not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the 8th through 13th quarters, because she did not make a good faith search for employment commensurate with her ability to work during those quarters. The claimant appeals the determination and the respondent (self-insured) counters that the decision should be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
It is undisputed that the claimant had not searched for work in any of the qualifying periods for the six quarters under review. It is the claimant’ position that she was totally unable to work. The qualifying periods for the quarters in issue covered the period from November 3, 1999, through May 1, 2001. The claimant had an injury to her lower back and left knee as a result of a slip-and-fall injury in __________, and has had no rehabilitation since the end of 1995. The self-insured also accepted a psychological component to the claimant’s injury. When asked why she did not seek a job where she could sit and stand as needed, the claimant stated that she did not trust or like people and could not be around them. The primary problem persisting through the quarters under review was the claimant’s knee.
The medical facts are detailed in our previous decision and the decision of the hearing officer. We have reviewed the evidence, the hearing officer’s decision, and the applicable rules of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, specifically Tex. W.C. Comm’n 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §130.102(d)(4) (Rule 130.102(d)(4)), which concerns how the “good faith search” requirement for SIBs is met when a search for employment is not made due to the contention that there is a total inability to work.
An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is as follows:
For service in person the address is:
RON JOSSELET, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
300 W. 15TH STREET
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR. STATE OFFICE BUILDING, 6TH FLOOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
For service by mail the address is:
RON JOSSELET, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
P.O. BOX 13777
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3777.
Susan M. Kelley
CONCUR:
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge