This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 31, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) was not entitled to supplemental income benefits for the 14th quarter.
The claimant appeals, contending that the great weight of other medical evidence was contrary to the opinions of the designated doctor, and that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (Commission) rules preempt the opinion of the treating doctor. The carrier responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
It is undisputed that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and has had spinal surgery. The parties stipulated that the qualifying period for the 14th quarter was from April 12, 2001, through July 11, 2001. The hearing officer, in his statement of the evidence, recites a detailed summary of the medical evidence.
Eligibility criteria for SIBs entitlement are set forth in Section 408.142(a) and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102). Rule 130.102(b) provides that an injured employee who has an impairment rating of 15% or greater and who has not commuted any impairment income benefits is eligible to receive SIBs if, during the qualifying period, the employee: (1) has earned less than 80% of the employee’s average weekly wage as a direct result of the impairment from the compensable injury; and (2) has made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work. The hearing officer’s finding that the claimant’s unemployment during the applicable quarter was a direct result of the impairment from the compensable injury has not been appealed and will not discussed further.
The claimant proceeds on a total inability to work theory. Rule 130.102(d)(4) provides the criteria on how an injured employee can meet the requirement to make a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the ability to work when a total inability to work is asserted. One of those elements is that no other records show that the injured employee is able to return to work.
In this case, Dr. G was appointed as a designated doctor pursuant to Rule 130.110 to determine the claimant’s ability to return to work. Rule 130.110 further provides that the designated doctor’s report shall have presumptive weight unless the great weight of the other medical evidence is to the contrary.
Dr. G, in a report dated February 5, 2001, noted that the claimant had been unable to complete an FCE, that she “has evidence of significant functional overlay,” and concluded that the claimant “is able to perform light duty” with certain restrictions as noted in an earlier January 2000 FCE. The hearing officer determined that, effective March 1, 2001 (when the Commission received Dr. G’s report), Dr. G’s “report was accorded presumptive weight” and was not contrary to the great weight of other medical evidence. The carrier also argues that even if Dr. G’s report is not accorded presumptive weight, it would be another record which shows an ability to work.
Upon review of the record submitted, we find no reversible error and we will not disturb the hearing officer’s determinations unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We do not so find and, consequently, the decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge