This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on December 4, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that the respondent (claimant) sustained an injury on _______________, and that the claimant had disability from _______________, through the CCH. The appellant (carrier) appeals, arguing that there is a lack of credible evidence supporting the determinations of the hearing officer. The claimant filed a response urging that the evidence was sufficient to support the determinations made.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that he worked in a furniture warehouse and that on _______________, while he was lowering a couch he felt a pop in his back and experienced back pain. An MRI revealed that at L5-S1 there is a loss of disc signal indicating disc degeneration, and there is a posterior disc protrusion, eccentric on the left, which measures approximately 3 millimeters in size and may well represent a disc herniation. The claimant’s treating doctor testified that in his opinion the claimant’s injury was work related rather than degenerative. The claimant testified that he was unable to work because of his injury from _______________, through the date of the CCH.
The hearing officer’s resolution of the injury, date of injury, and disability issues turn on factual questions on which there was conflicted evidence. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no basis to overturn the hearing officer’s factual findings or his resolution of the issues before him which were based upon those factual determinations.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Terri Kay Oliver – Appeals Judge