This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on June 27, 2002. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable lumbar spine injury on _______, and that he had disability from ________ through May 9, 2002, but not from May 10, 2002, through June 27, 2002. The appellant (carrier) appealed and the claimant responded.
DECISION
The hearing officer’s decision is affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury as defined by Section 401.011(10) and that he has had disability as defined by Section 401.011(16). The claimant contended that he sustained a lumbar spine injury while working for the employer on ________ when he lifted a heavy valve and then, about 30 minutes later, pulled a pipe up with a rope. He felt sharp lower back pain that went down his leg on both occasions. The claimant was taken from the workplace to a hospital on the day of the claimed injury, where he was seen for complaints of back pain. He remained hospitalized for several days, and an MRI taken on February 11, 2002, showed a herniated lumbar disc. The claimant’s treating doctor wrote that the reported back injury from lifting at work on ________ is consistent with the MRI finding of a herniated disc.
We disagree with the carrier’s assertion that expert medical evidence based on reasonable medical probability was necessary to establish that the claimed mechanism of injury in this case caused the claimed injury. As a general rule, in workers’ compensation cases the issues of injury and disability may be established by the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston General Insurance Company v. Pegues, 514 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not view this case as coming within the exception to the general rule that would require expert medical evidence based on reasonable medical probability to establish causation due to the scientific or technical nature of the subject matter.
The hearing officer had the responsibility to resolve the conflicts in the evidence and to determine what facts had been established. The hearing officer may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of a witness. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). Although there is conflicting evidence, the hearing officer’s determinations on the issues of compensable injury and disability are supported by the claimant’s testimony and by the reports of the treating doctor. We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).
The carrier states that the hearing officer erred in several evidentiary rulings, but the carrier does not specify what rulings it is complaining about. The record reflects that all of the exhibits offered by the parties were admitted without objection, and that the carrier did not object to the claimant’s testimony, except as to a leading question which was rephrased by the claimant’s attorney. We conclude that any complaints the carrier may have regarding the evidence admitted at the CCH were not preserved for appeal and that the carrier has failed to specify what those complaints are. Consequently, error has not been shown.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is BANKERS STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
ROBIN M. MOUNTAIN
6600 CAMPUS CIRCLE DRIVE, SUITE 300
IRVING, TEXAS 75063.
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge