This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 8, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant herein) did not suffer a compensable injury on ________ and that he did not have disability. The claimant appeals, contending that these determinations were contrary to the evidence. The claimant specifically argues that the hearing officer did not give proper weight to the medical evidence and that her decision was biased. The claimant also attaches additional evidence to his request for review. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the Appeals Panel should not consider evidence not put in the record at the CCH and that the hearing officer’s decision is sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
First, we note that we will not generally consider evidence not submitted into the record, and raised for the first time on appeal. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92255, decided July 27, 1992. To determine whether evidence offered for the first time on appeal requires that case be remanded for further consideration, we consider whether it came to appellant’s knowledge after the hearing, whether it is cumulative, whether it was through lack of diligence that it was not offered at the hearing, and whether it is so material that it would probably produce a different result. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93111, decided March 29, 1993; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). Applying this standard, attachments to the claimant’s request for review which were not admitted into evidence at the CCH will not be considered on appeal. There is no showing and no reason to believe that with the exercise of diligence that this evidence could not have been obtained prior to the CCH.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness.
Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Applying this standard, we find no basis to overturn the hearing officer’s finding of no injury.
Finally, with no compensable injury found, there is no loss upon which to find disability. By definition disability depends upon a compensable injury. See Section 401.011 (16).
As far as bias is concerned, we find no evidence that the hearing officer was biased. The claimant appears to base his contention of bias upon the fact that he disagrees with the weight the hearing officer gave to the medical evidence. We do not find that this constituted evidence of bias.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:
C T CORPORATION
350 NORTH ST. PAUL
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge