This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 19, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) was not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the sixth quarter.
The claimant appealed, asserting that he looked for work every week of the qualifying period and that the hearing officer’s decision is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
Section 408.142(a) and TEX. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102) set out the statutory and administrative rule requirements for SIBs. At issue in this case is whether the claimant met the good faith job search requirement of Section 408.142(a)(4) by meeting the requirements of Rule 130.102(e). The hearing officer’s determination on the direct result requirement has not been appealed.
The SIBs criterion in issue is whether the claimant made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work during the relevant qualifying period of the sixth quarter. Rule 130.102(e) provides in part that, except as provided in subsection (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of Rule 130.102, an injured employee who has not returned to work and is able to return to work in any capacity shall look for employment commensurate with his or her ability to work every week of the qualifying period and document his or her job search effort. In this case the claimant documented 26 job contacts with at least one contact each week. However one doctor’s note indicates that the claimant said that he “does not wish to work any longer.” The hearing officer commented that the claimant “has made less than a whole hearted effort to return to work.” The hearing officer determined that the claimant had not made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust and we do not find it to be so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Thomas A. Knapp
CONCUR:
Veronica L. Ruberto – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge