This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on September 24, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant herein) did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease; that the date of the claimed injury was ____________; and that the respondent (carrier herein) was relieved of liability because the claimant failed to timely report an injury to the employer without good cause. The claimant appeals, essentially contending that the decision of the hearing officer was contrary to the evidence and detailing the evidence contrary to the determinations of the hearing officer. The carrier responds that the decision of the hearing officer was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The hearing officer’s resolution of the injury, date of injury, and timely report of the injury issues turn on factual determinations on which there was conflicting evidence. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no basis to overturn the hearing officer’s factual findings or his resolution of the issues before him which were based upon those factual determinations. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CITY MANAGER
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge