Title: 

APD 030138

Significant Decision

Date: 

February 26, 2003

Issues: 

Disabilty/Existence-Duration, Existence of Compensable Inj, Timely Reporting to Employer

Table of Contents

APD 030138

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on December 11, 2002. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on ____________; that the claimant does not have disability within the meaning of the 1989 Act; and that the claimant did not timely report his alleged injury to the employer and did not have good cause for failing to do so. The claimant appealed, essentially on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The claimant testified that on ____________, he was working at the warehouse for the employer, loading a trailer when he thought he pulled a muscle. He testified that he felt pain off and on, and in early March of 2002 began to feel “sensations” in his leg. The claimant first saw a doctor on March 28, 2002.

The claimant had the burden to prove that he was injured in the course and scope of employment, that he has had disability, and that he gave timely notice of his injury to his employer under Section 409.001 or had good cause for failing to timely notify his employer of his injury. Conflicting evidence was presented at the CCH. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). The finder of fact may believe that the claimant has an injury, but disbelieve that the injury occurred at work as claimed. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). A fact finder is not bound by medical evidence where the credibility of that evidence is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the doctor by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Our review of the record reveals that the hearing officer’s injury, disability, and notice determinations were supported by sufficient evidence and are not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to disturb that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY

800 BRAZOS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

Thomas A. Knapp

CONCUR:

Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge

Roy L. Warren – Appeals Judge