This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 15, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant herein) had disability from the compensable injury of ____________, with disability beginning on June 25 and continuing through July 14, 2002. The claimant appeals, contending that this determination was contrary to the evidence, which supported his disability continuing after July 14, 2002. The claimant also complains that while the hearing officer made a fact finding that the claimant was not unable to work due to his compensable injury beginning on July 15, 2002, the hearing officer erred by not making a corresponding conclusion of law. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the hearing officer’s decision should be affirmed.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
Disability is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
In the present case there was conflicting evidence concerning disability. It was the province of the hearing officer to resolve those conflicts. Applying the standard of review discussed above, we find no basis to reverse the decision of the hearing officer.
Nor do we find merit in the claimant’s argument that the hearing officer failed to make a conclusion of law resolving the disability issue. The disability issue in this case was framed in terms of whether the claimant had disability, and if so, for what periods. The hearing officer concluded that the claimant had disability beginning on June 25 and continuing through July 14, 2002. This conclusion of law resolved the disability issue before the hearing officer.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is THE CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICES COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Daniel R. Barry – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge