This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 15, 2003. With respect to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury of _____________, does not include an injury to the left knee consisting of chondromalacia of the patellofemoral joint and lateral tracking of the patella and that the claimant had disability, as a result of her compensable injury, from April 26 to May 24, 2002. In her appeal, the claimant essentially argues that the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury determination is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the respondent (self-insured) urges affirmance. The claimant did not appeal the hearing officer’s determination that her disability ended on May 24, 2002, and that determination has, therefore, become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant had the burden to prove that her _____________, compensable injury included a left knee injury consisting of chondromalacia of the patellofemoral joint and lateral tracking of the patella. That issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer. There was conflicting evidence presented on the disputed issue. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As such, the hearing officer was required to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts the evidence established. In this instance, the hearing officer simply was not persuaded that the claimant sustained her burden of proving the causal connection between her compensable injury and the chondromalacia of the patellofemoral joint and lateral tracking of the patella in the left knee. The hearing officer was acting within her province as the finder of fact in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the challenged determination is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to disturb that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
SUPERINTENDENT
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Elaine M. Chaney
CONCUR:
Margaret L. Turner – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge