Title: 

APD 031371

Significant Decision

Date: 

July 9, 2003

Issues: 

Disabilty/Existence-Duration, Existence of Compensable Inj

Table of Contents

APD 031371

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on April 17, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the appellant (claimant herein) sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and had disability from September 20 through November 7, 2002. The claimant appeals, contending the evidence showed she had disability from November 8, 2002, continuing through the date of the CCH. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that the claimant did not have disability from November 8, 2002, continuing through the date of the CCH. Neither party appeals the hearing officer’s findings that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and had disability from September 20 through November 7, 2002, and these determinations have become final by operation of Section 410.169.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

Disability is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

The claimant bears the burden to prove disability. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal Panel No. 91122, decided February 6, 1992. Applying the above standard of review, we cannot say that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in the present case in finding that the claimant did not meet her burden of proving disability after November 7, 2002. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY

800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750, COMMODORE 1

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

Gary L. Kilgore

CONCUR:

Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge