This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on December 1, 2003. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by deciding that the respondent (claimant) was entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the third quarter, September 4 through December 3, 2003. The appellant (self-insured) appealed, disputing the determination. The appeal file does not contain a response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The requirements for entitlement to SIBs are set out in Section 408.142 and in Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102). The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ______________, with an impairment rating of 15% or greater; that the claimant has not commuted any portion of his impairment income benefits; and that the qualifying period for the third quarter of SIBs was from May 23 through August 21, 2003. At issue in this case is whether the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of the impairment from the compensable injury and whether the claimant met the good faith job search requirement of Section 408.142(a)(4) by complying with Rule 130.102(d)(5).
A finding of “direct result” is sufficiently supported by evidence that an injured employee sustained an injury with lasting effects and could not reasonably perform the type of work being done at the time of the injury. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950376, decided April 26, 1995; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950771, decided June 29, 1995. In order to satisfy the direct result requirement, one only need prove that the unemployment or underemployment was a direct result of the compensable injury. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 001786, decided September 13, 2000. Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer’s direct result finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
With regard to the good faith criterion, Rule 130.102(e) provides that, except as provided in subsection (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 130.102, an injured employee who has not returned to work and is able to return to work in any capacity shall look for employment commensurate with his or her ability to work every week of the qualifying period and document his or her job search efforts. That subsection then lists information to be considered in determining whether a good faith effort has been made. Good faith effort is a factual determination for the hearing officer to resolve. There is sufficient evidence to support the finding that the claimant attempted in good faith to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work.
We conclude that the hearing officer’s determinations are supported by the record and are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain, supra.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CITY SECRETARY
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Margaret L. Turner
CONCUR:
Chris Cowan – Appeals Judge
Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge