This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 4, 2004. The hearing officer decided that the appellant/cross-respondent (claimant herein) sustained a compensable injury on _____________; that this compensable injury extends to include an injury to his cervical area, but does not extend to include an injury to his head or thoracic area nor does it include either vertigo or cervicogenic headaches; that the respondent/cross-appellant (carrier herein) did not waive the right to contest compensability of the injury; and that the claimant did not have disability. The claimant appeals the hearing officer’s extent-of-injury and disability determinations, contending that the evidence established that the injury included an injury to his thoracic spine as well as vertigo and cervicogenic headaches, and that the claimant had disability. The carrier replies that the hearing officer’s decision correctly determined that the claimant did not have disability and that the claimant’s injury did not include a head injury, a thoracic injury or vertigo and cervicogenic headaches. The carrier files a request for review in which it appeals the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant’s injury extended to his cervical spine. There is no response from the claimant to the carrier’s request for review in the appeal file.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The issues of extent-of-injury and disability are questions of fact. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer’s decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
LEO F. MALO
12222 MERIT DRIVE, SUITE 700
DALLAS, TEXAS 75251.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner – Appeals Judge