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APD 041494
August 12, 2004

APD 041494

August 12, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 27, 2004. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and that he had disability from November 26, 2003, through February 1, 2004. In its appeal, the appellant (carrier) argues that those determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In his response to the carrier’s appeal, the claimant urges affirmance.



The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and that he had disability from November 26, 2003, through February 1, 2004. Those issues presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The hearing officer was persuaded that the claimant sustained his burden of proving that he sustained an injury while loading food products into a truck at work on ______________, and that he had disability for the period from November 26, 2003, through February 1, 2004. The factors emphasized by the carrier in challenging those determinations on appeal are the same factors it emphasized at the hearing. The significance, if any, of those factors was a matter for the hearing officer in resolving the issues before him. Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the challenged determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the injury and disability determinations on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is




Elaine M. Chaney
Appeals Judge


Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

Veronica L. Ruberto
Appeals Judge