This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on June 2, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the _____________, compensable injury extends to include the diagnosis of avascular necrosis (AVN) of the right hip and that the respondent (claimant) had disability beginning October 28, 2002, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) appealed, disputing both the extent-of-injury and disability determinations. The appeal file does not contain a response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on _____________. The hearing officer determined that the claimant's compensable injury extended to AVN of the right hip and that the claimant had disability beginning October 28, 2002, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The issues of extent of injury and disability presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence under Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). In this case, there was conflicting evidence on the question of whether the compensable injury extended to include the diagnosis of AVN. In a report dated April 20, 2004, Dr. E opined that within reasonable medical probability, the _____________, injury caused the AVN to develop.
Our review of the record does not reveal that the hearing officer's extent-of-injury and disability determinations are so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse those determinations on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
According to information provided by the carrier, the true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH NORTH AMERICA, A DIVISION OF ZURICH NORTH AMERICA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
LEO MALO
ZURICH NORTH AMERICA
12222 MERIT DRIVE, SUITE 700
DALLAS, TEXAS 75251.
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge