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APD 041862
September 7, 2004

APD 041862

September 7, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 5, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent/cross-appellant (claimant) is entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the second quarter, but is not entitled to SIBs for the first, third, seventh, or eighth quarters. The appellant/cross-respondent (carrier) appealed the determination that the claimant is entitled to second quarter SIBs. The claimant appealed the determinations that he is not entitled to SIBs for the first, third, seventh, or eighth quarters. Both parties responded to the opposition’s appeal.



Eligibility criteria for SIBs entitlement are set forth in Section 408.142(a) and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102 (Rule 130.102). At issue in this case is whether the claimant satisfied the good faith job search requirement of Section 408.142(a)(4) by complying with Rule 130.102(d)(5), which provides that an injured employee has made a good faith effort to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work if the employee has provided sufficient documentation as described in Rule 130.102(e) to show that he has made a good faith effort to obtain employment. Rule 130.102(e) provides that an injured employee who has not returned to work and is able to return to work in any capacity shall look for employment commensurate with his or her ability to work every week of the qualifying period and document his or her job search efforts. That subsection then lists information to be considered in determining whether a good faith effort has been made.

Whether the claimant satisfied the good faith requirement for SIBs entitlement was a factual question for the hearing officer to resolve. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). It was the hearing officer's prerogative to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, including that of the claimant. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer’s decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is




Chris Cowan


Judy L. S. Barnes
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge