This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 14, 2025, with the record closing on October 16, 2025, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issue by deciding that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury). The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determination. The respondent (self-insured) responded, urging affirmance of the ALJ’s determination.
DECISION
Reversed and rendered.
The parties stipulated, in part, that on (date of injury), the claimant sustained damage or harm to the physical structure of his body in a motor vehicle accident (MVA); the claimant was driving to work from his residence on (date of injury), at the time of his MVA; and the claimant was driving a County issued patrol vehicle at the time of his MVA. The claimant, a police officer and accident investigator, testified that on (date of injury), he exited his residence in County, entered his patrol car in his driveway, got on the radio and notified dispatch that he was on duty as required by the employer’s policy, then left his residence. On the way to his station in County he was involved in an MVA when a vehicle had pulled out from a stop sign, and the claimant was unable to avoid the collision.
The claimant testified that he is required by the employer’s regulations to sign in with dispatch before he leaves his house and then sign out with dispatch when he arrives back at his house at the end of his shift. The claimant testified he is considered on duty and is paid from the time he signs in with dispatch until the time he signs out and was considered on duty at the time of the MVA. The claimant also testified that regardless of what county he is in he has a duty to act as a peace officer if he observes a felony or breach of the peace and can effect an arrest if needed.
Section 401.011(12) provides:
(12) “Course and scope of employment” means an activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that it is performed by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. The term includes an activity conducted on the premises of the employer or at other locations. The term does not include:
(A) transportation to and from the place of employment unless:
(i) the transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or is paid for by the employer;
(ii) the means of the transportation are under the control of the employer; or
(iii) the employee is directed in the employee’s employment to proceed from one place to another place[.]
The general rule is that an injury occurring in the use of public streets or highways in going to and returning from the place of employment is not compensable. American General Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 303 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1957). The rule is known as the “coming and going” rule. The rationale of the rule is that “in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.” Texas General Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. 1963). In order for the exceptions to the coming and going rule to apply the claimant must not only show that a specific exception applies, but must show that the injury is of a kind or character that had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade, or profession of his employer and was received while the claimant was engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Id.
It is undisputed that the employer furnished the claimant’s transportation. The ALJ noted in her discussion that this alone does not render an injury sustained during travel as compensable. The claimant must prove that he was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury, which includes the claimant was in the furtherance of the affairs of the employer’s business. The ALJ stated “[t]he persuasive evidence supports that the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of the [MVA] on (date of injury),” and determined that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury). We disagree.
Orozco v. County of El Paso, 602 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2020), is a case in which the Supreme Court of Texas addressed a very similar scenario. In that case a deputy sheriff was killed in a MVA while driving his marked patrol car home after completing an approved extra-duty assignment. The deputy was initially determined to have been commuting home and excluded under the coming and going rule. However, the Court held that the deputy was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he was killed and provided explanation regarding the statutory course and scope inquiry for travel by a peace officer in an employer-provided unit.
As previously noted, Section 401.011(12) provides that “course and scope of employment” requires an activity that (1) has to do with and originates in the employer’s work and (2) is performed while engaged in or about the furtherance of the employer’s affairs. See also State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tex. 2017). When an injury occurs during travel, as in Orozco and the case on appeal, Section 401.011(12) also includes exclusions, such as the coming and going rule. However, even if an exception to an exclusion applies the injured employee must still show that the injury both originates in the work and furthers the employers affairs or business. See SeaBright Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 465 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tex. 2015).
The Supreme Court of Texas concluded in Orozco that the authorized operation of a marked patrol car on public streets by a uniformed deputy sheriff, under a department policy treating the vehicle as a take-home unit for official business, furthered the department’s work in preserving the peace and responding to citizens in need of assistance. Orozco at 395. The Court rejected the argument that the deputy had to be responding to a specific call at the moment of the accident, emphasizing instead that operating the patrol car as authorized and in accordance with department procedures (including dispatch check-in and availability) was itself a law-enforcement activity that originated in and furthered the employer’s business. Id.
It is undisputed in the case on appeal that the claimant was a peace officer and an accident investigator, and at the time of the (date of injury), MVA he was driving a County issued patrol vehicle from his residence to his station. The evidence established that the claimant signed in with dispatch before leaving his residence on (date of injury), as required by employer regulations, and remained subject to acting as a peace officer if he observed a felony or a breach of the peace.
As in Orozco, the employer furnished the claimant’s transportation and the means of transportation were under the employer’s control; therefore, the exceptions to the coming and going rule found in Section 401.011(12)(A)(i) and (ii) apply. However, satisfying an exception does not, by itself, establish course and scope. The inquiry then turns to whether the travel originated in and furthered the employer’s affairs. See Bottom, at 353; SeaBright, at 645.
In the case on appeal the employer’s policy requiring the claimant to sign in with dispatch as being on duty before leaving his residence and to remain in contact and available established that the claimant’s travel in his marked unit was part of the employer’s law enforcement function rather than a purely personal commute. However, unlike the deputy in Orozco, the claimant was on duty and paid from the time he signed in with dispatch until he signed out at the end of his shift and was considered on duty at the time of the MVA. This evidence supports the claimant’s travel originated in and furthered the employer’s affairs because it shows the employer treated the claimant’s workday as beginning when he reported for duty at home and required him to remain available in the marked unit during the drive. Evidence of paid travel time is relevant to the origination analysis. See Cook v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 677 S.W.3d 52, 60-61 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2023, no pet.); Hart v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 12-24-00013-CV (Tex.App.—Tyler Nov. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Under the totality of the circumstances, the claimant’s authorized operation of the employer-provided patrol vehicle after reporting to dispatch was an activity that concerned and originated in the employer’s law-enforcement work and was performed in furtherance of the employer’s affairs. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), and we render a new decision that the claimant did sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury).
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
(NAME)
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge