A contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, on July 2, 1992, (hearing officer) presiding as hearing officer. He determined that the appellant had not established that her neck injury was caused by work-related activities and therefore was not entitled to benefits under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art 8308-1.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1992) (1989 Act). Appellant urges that her job required repetitive neck movement and that her doctor indicated it was conceivable that her injury was sustained in the constant neck turning she did in her job.
DECISION
Determining the decision of the hearing officer was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.
The evidence in this case is thoroughly and fairly set out in the Decision and Order of the hearing officer and is adopted for purposes of this decision. Succinctly, the appellant was a supervisor for the employer who operated a bus transportation business. Her duties required her to monitor bus schedules, which she would do by driving over routes in a passenger car, and other details such as investigating accidents, picking up lost and found items, and driving vans and buses during peak times when overtime was necessary. The bag she would occasionally carry to the office with lost and found items would vary in weight but was not described as being heavy. She would also carry, to and from her vehicle, a large purse which contained, among other items, several repair tools such as a screwdriver, pliers and a couple of wrenches. The evidence in the record indicates the weight of the tools to be from about two and a half pounds to three to four pounds. She also carried a schedule book which she estimated to weigh eight to ten pounds. She stated that driving a bus or van required a lot of neck movement and that she had been working considerable overtime in (month year), much of which was driving buses and vans. (The appellant complains that her handwritten notes concerning overtime, a copy of which is attached to her request for review, were wrongfully excluded by the hearing officer because of a failure to comply with exchange of evidence requirements. We do not consider evidence on review which was not considered by the hearing officer and having reviewed his ruling excluding the evidence, do not find that he erred. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92165 (Docket No. redacted) decided June 5, 1992. We also note the substance of this document was before the hearing officer by way of the appellant’s testimony.)
The appellant testified that neck pain and stiffness began to develop several days before her first visit to a medical facility on Tuesday, (date of injury). She was given medication and told not to work for three days. The following Saturday she states the pain got worse and she saw another doctor and was advised to remain off work. She returned to work on the 16th and worked her regular duties until October 31, 1991, when the pain again developed in her neck and she was referred by her employer to a medical facility used by them. She was treated by several different doctors and was returned to light duty on November 11, 1991. An MRI scan was performed in late November which showed a disc herniation at C5-6 for which she ultimately had surgery in April 1992. The appellant denied any prior neck or back problems or any event outside her employment that caused injury to her neck. She also denied any specific event or incident on the job which resulted in her neck injury and pain. She stated that “all the time I thought the pain was stress” and that she could not really say when it started but that on (date of injury), it got so bad she went to the doctor. She also testified she had a previous workers’ compensation claim in December 1990 from slipping and falling on ice. She stated she went to the doctor under her group health plan on (date of injury).
The pertinent medical evidence in the record regarding any relationship between the appellant’s work and her neck injury is contained in a narrative report of one of the appellant’s treating physicians, the physician who performed the surgery:
Certainly, I cannot say that this is a workman’s comp injury, but in view of the fact that she has not related any other history and does a constant amount of neck turning with her job I think it is conceivable that she has had wear and tear on the disc and subsequently had the disc rupture. However, this certainly could have occurred just as a normal event of life.
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Clearly, it is puzzling as to the exact etiology of onset of this problem.
A claimant has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a claimed injury occurred in the course and scope of employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A repetitive trauma injury, which is the nature of the injury urged by the appellant in this case, is within the definition of an occupational disease. Article 8308-1.03(36). To establish an occupational disease, there must be probative evidence of a causal connection between the employment and the disease. INA of Texas v. Adams, 793 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ). Where the matter of causation is not in an area of common knowledge or experience, expert or scientific evidence maybe essential to show causation. Houston General Insurance Co. v. Pegues, 514 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The only medical evidence in this case does not establish this causal connection by a “reasonable medical probability.” See Parker v. Employer Mutual Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
The hearing officer found that the hand tools that the appellant regularly carried in her purse were not of such weight as would constitute a physically traumatic activity, and that the repetitive neck movement associated with her driving activities “was not performed with a greater degree or intensity than such movement would be performed in everyday activities.” There is sufficient evidence of record to support these findings. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence, and of the weight and credibility to be given the evidence. Article 8308-6.34(e). The hearing officer may believe all, part or none of the testimony of any witness, and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92232 (Docket No. redacted) decided July 20, 1992. Given the relatively modest lifting requirements associated with the appellant’s position, the rather common neck movements involved in her routine driving assignments, and the absence of medical or other expert or scientific evidence establishing any degree of reasonable medical probability of a causal link between the injury and the employment, we do not find the hearing officer’s determinations to be against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence nor warranting any corrective action on our part. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92048 (Docket No. redacted) decided March 18, 1992. Accordingly, the decision of the hearing officer is affirmed.
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
Lynda H. Nesenholtz – Appeals Judge