On August 12, 1992, a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, with (hearing officer) presiding as the hearing officer. The hearing officer found that the claimant’s employer had actual knowledge of claimant’s accidental injury of (date of injury 1), and was notified of claimant’s repetitive trauma injury on (date of injury 2), which was within 30 days of the date claimant knew or should have known it may be related to her employment. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., carrier herein, was ordered to pay benefits to the claimant. The carrier appealed, contending the hearing officer failed to address the issue of whether claimant had disability from her injury of (date of injury 1), rather than from her repetitive trauma injury of (date of injury 2), or both. The distinction is deemed important in that there were apparently different insurance carriers on the different dates of injury involved. The claimant filed no response. This appeal is decided under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 8308-1.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1992) (1989 Act).
DECISION
Finding a significant and unresolved matter, we reverse and remand.
The record shows that claimant was a 32 year old secretary employed by (employer). The claimant performed regular secretarial duties involving heavy computer use, typing correspondence, and composing, typing and mailing the church bulletin and newsletter. Claimant’s immediate supervisor was (BB), the business administrator, but she also did work for the pastor and the associate pastor, (Pastor S). The evidence is, and the hearing officer found, that on (date of injury 1), claimant got up from her desk and was going around the desk when she fell and landed in a sitting position. Claimant had used both hands to shield her head from the corner of the desk and to break her fall. (Pastor S), the associate pastor, was the only other person in the area. Claimant called for help and (Pastor S) assisted claimant to her feet. Claimant limped back to her desk and later left work early to go to the doctor. Claimant continued work after (date of injury 1), working at the computer at least 35 hours a week. In November 1991 claimant began experiencing pain in her hands and wrists. Because of the press of work, claimant did not make an attempt to see a doctor about her wrists until January 20, 1991. At that time, she made an appointment with (JM) and actually saw the doctor on (date of injury 2). The hearing officer determined that claimant had a bone spur in her left wrist and that the bone spur was due to claimant’s fall at work on (date of injury 1). The hearing officer further found that claimant’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was due to claimant’s repetitive use of her computer at work. Dr. JM’s office called the employer and reported the repetitive trauma injury on (date of injury 2). On approximately March 18, 1992, claimant was terminated from her employment. On April 20, 1992 the doctor ordered that claimant not resume work.
The carrier’s sole issue on appeal is that the hearing officer failed to specify whether claimant’s present disability was due to the (date of injury 1) injury or the repetitive trauma injury discovered and reported on (date of injury 2).
The hearing officer found that the employer had actual notice of the fall and resultant likely injury to claimant’s hands on (date of injury 1). The carrier does not appeal the findings and conclusions dealing with the (date of injury 1) fall and thus those facts will only be discussed as they pertain to the issue in dispute. After the fall, claimant did not miss any work. The testimony was that in November 1991, claimant began experiencing pain in her wrists and hands. At this time claimant had still not missed any work and the testimony was that her work schedule prevented her from taking time off to go to the doctor. Finally, in January the pain became so severe that on January 20, 1992, claimant scheduled a doctor’s appointment for (date of injury 2). It was at the (date of injury 2) doctor’s visit that a high impact injury and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome were discovered.
The 1989 Act, Article 8308-1.03(36) defines occupational disease to include repetitive trauma injuries. Article 8308-1.03(39) defines repetitive trauma injury as damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious, physically traumatic activities that occur over time and arise out of and in the course and scope of employment. The uncontroverted evidence was that claimant worked at a keyboard (typewriter or computer) approximately 35 hours a week. This evidence, together with the medical evidence, supports the hearing officer’s finding that “claimant’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was due to her repetitive use of her computer at work.” There is no dispute that this repetitive trauma injury was timely reported to the appropriate party representing the employer in accordance with Articles 8308-4.14, 8308-5.02(1) and 8308-5.01(a).
Although the bone spur in claimant’s left wrist was the result of the (date of injury 1) fall, the fact remained that claimant continued to work with no apparent discomfort until November 1991, when she began experiencing pain. The pain continued and worsened, causing claimant to see a doctor on (date of injury 2) , when the carpal tunnel syndrome was discovered. Claimant’s disability did not commence until April 20, 1992.
The issues framed at the contested case hearing were: (1) did claimant report an injury to her employer in a timely manner (this has been clearly answered in the affirmative); and, (2) does claimant have disability from her injury of (date of injury 1). Although it is clear that claimant does have disability from an injury, it is not clear whether the hearing officer found that the disability resulted from the (date of injury 1) fall and resultant bone spur, from the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, or if there was a causal relationship emanating from the (date of injury 1) injury through the carpal tunnel injury. Although we may believe one injury, or the other, or both, may have resulted in disability, such a conclusion on our part would be pure speculation. The carrier’s appeal on this point is well taken.
It is clear that two compensable injuries occurred. One injury occurred on (date of injury 1), and consisted of a fall which resulted in some injury (a bone spur) to the hands and bruises to the legs. No work was missed at that time. The other injury is a repetitive trauma injury (bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome) due to claimant’s computer use at work. This injury was reported on (date of injury 2), the day it was discovered. We do not know the relationship between the two, if any. Claimant continued to work until March 18, 1992, when she was terminated. Claimant continued to have pain and to see the doctor for her carpal tunnel syndrome. By report dated April 20, 1992 the doctor ordered that claimant not resume work. The hearing officer found the claimant “. . . began to have disability on April 20, 1992, and continues to have disability.” The carrier was ordered to pay the benefits due claimant under the Act. Even though not clear, and given the hearing officer’s failure to address one of the framed issues, had there been only one carrier, that issue could possibly have been resolved without a remand. However, given there are two carriers, it becomes highly relevant that the hearing officer answer the framed issue of whether the claimant had disability from her injury of (date of injury 1). By inference, this issue should be expanded to ask whether claimant’s present disability resulted from the injury of (date of injury 1), or the repetitive trauma injury reported on (date of injury 2), or both.
The decision of the hearing officer is reversed and the case remanded for the expedited development of additional evidence, as appropriate, and for further consideration and findings as are appropriate and not inconsistent with this opinion. Pending resolution of the remand, a final decision has not been made in this case.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge