This appeal is considered in accordance with the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (1989 Act), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Article 8308-1.01 et seq.). On November 1, 1993, a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, with (hearing officer) presiding, to determine whether claimant, GM, who is the appellant, was injured on (date of injury), in the course and scope of her employment with (employer); whether claimant gave timely notice of injury to the employer; and whether the claimant had disability as a result of her injury. The hearing officer determined that claimant gave timely notice of injury, which the carrier stated it did not dispute and which has not been appealed.
The hearing officer determined that the claimant had not proved that she sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of her employment, and therefore did not have a period of disability because there was no compensable injury.
The claimant appeals both of these conclusions and related findings as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The carrier responds by noting the evidence that is in favor of upholding the decision.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The claimant stated that on (date of injury), during the evening shift, she was being trained to work as a “bundle boy.” At about 11:15 p.m., as she was transporting a large box of materials on a dolly, she stated that she was pulled forward by the weight of the box on the dolly and had immediate pain across her waist. Claimant was asked to clarify her reference to her “waist” and indicated her lower back area. The claimant said that she assumed that her waist pain, which continued thereafter, was a kidney problem. The record indicated that claimant began losing time from work on July 14, 1993.
The claimant first went to a doctor associated with her health maintenance organization on July 15, 1993, (Dr. B). A health record from Dr. B dated July 15 and 19, 1993, stated that claimant’s urinalysis was negative and that a lumbosacral spine series was normal. Dr. B opined that claimant had lumbar strain. Records show that as of July 27, 1993, claimant was released to work by Dr. B with restrictions on lifting (not over 20 lbs).
On July 17, 1993, in between consultations with Dr. B, claimant went to a hospital emergency room of a local hospital for low back pain and received pain medication. Claimant was treated by doctors at Clinic on July 27th for lumbosacral strain. Claimant was treated August 18, 1993, by (Dr. Z) for low back pain. She saw Dr. Z on September 13, 1993, after which he documented an entirely normal clinical examination, although claimant continued to complain of low back pain. Claimant stated that this was the last time she had seen a doctor prior to the hearing. Except for asking about the availability of restricted work at the employer, she had not looked for a job.
(Ms. A) testified that she was training claimant on (date of injury), during a four hour shift, to take her place, and that she did not recall that claimant pushed the dolly. Ms. A stated that she pushed the dolly with the box of materials to demonstrate to claimant how it was done. Ms. A stated that pushing the dolly and transporting materials would be a primary duty of a “bundle boy.” Ms. A said claimant did not appear to be in pain nor complain of pain that night.
(Ms. D), a line supervisor, reported that claimant complained to her on July 12th that she had back pain. She did not indicate that it was job-related, so Ms. D assumed that it was not.
(Ms. F), another supervisor, stated that claimant first reported a work-related injury to her on July 19th. It was her understanding that claimant had earlier reported she was ill and had blood in her urine. Ms. F said there was no light duty available. She said that claimant’s version of how she was hurt kept changing.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, the materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). A trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters’ Insurance Co., 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). There are conflicts in the record, but those were the responsibility of the hearing officer to judge, considering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a whole. The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The hearing officer may have determined that, although a lumbar sprain was diagnosed, that claimant had not proved it occurred at work as opposed to elsewhere, in light of her co-worker’s testimony and claimant’s ability to keep working immediately after the alleged incident with
the dolly. He could have considered that she delayed seeing a doctor for 13 days. In this case, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s conclusion that claimant did not sustain a work-related accident. We affirm his decision.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge