This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993)(1989 Act). A hearing was held in (city), Texas, on April 6, 1993, to decide three issues: whether the claimant suffered a compensable injury on (date of injury); if so, whether he reported it to his employer within 30 days; and whether the claimant had disability from his injury, if any. The appellant, hereinafter claimant, appeals hearing officer (hearing officer) determination of each of these issues against him and in favor of respondent, hereinafter carrier. The carrier essentially responds that the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions are correct and supported by the evidence.
DECISION
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The claimant testified through an interpreter that he had been employed by (employer). On March 21, 1992, as he lifted a tire he said he felt pain and a burning sensation. He immediately went to the supervisor, (Mr. D) and told him that he had suffered an accident and had “pain on the bottom.” He said Mr. D told him he could go home if he wanted to, and that Mr. D thereafter instructed a coworker, (Mr. U), to take over claimant’s work. The claimant also said he told another coworker, (Mr. H), that he had been injured. The claimant went home and when he returned to work the next scheduled workday, March 23rd, the supervisor that day, (Mr. O), asked him how he was feeling. He said he told Mr. O he was still hurting and asked to see a doctor; he said Mr. O said he would talk to the manager about it, but he never got back to claimant. The claimant continued to work but was laid off by employer on April 3rd.
Medical records from Hospital show the claimant first saw a doctor for his injury on August 31, 1992. The claimant said that he did not seek medical attention before then because he was waiting to see if it would be taken care of by his employer, and also because he thought the pain would go away through massage and strapping of the injured part (he stated that he developed a bulge or swelling in his left side the day following the incident). Nurse’s notes dated August 31st state in part that claimant “worked lifting heavy tires and felt pull in L inguinal area – 1 month ago.” The claimant said he could not remember giving a statement to the nurse, but he said there was no other incident between April and August in which he injured himself. The claimant was diagnosed with inguinal hernia and had surgery to correct the hernia on September 21st.
Mr. D, who at the time of the hearing was no longer working for the employer, testified that he could not remember whether he was at work on March 21st, and he could not recall anything about claimant suffering an injury, including claimant’s going home or assigning anyone to replace claimant. He said the normal procedure would be to let an injured employee go home and then to get a doctor’s note and to call “workerman’s comp or risk management.” He said any time he received a claim he filled out paperwork on it, but did not recall doing so for claimant.
(Mr. G), who at the time of the hearing was employer’s general manager, said he was a salesman on March 21st and would not have supervised claimant except on those Saturdays when it was his turn to act as supervisor. He said the first he heard of claimant’s injury was in August, when the hospital called; at that time, he talked to various employees (including Mr. H and Mr. U) and no one remembered claimant having been injured. Mr. G said he observed claimant around employer’s warehouse and when he was a salesman had occasion to ask claimant to pull out and load tires, but said during the last two or three weeks claimant was there he had very little contact with him.
Mr. G also said claimant came by employer’s place of business sometime after he had been laid off and said he was working somewhere else. On cross-examination, the claimant said the only work he had done between April 3rd and the time he first went to a doctor was mowing lawns for relatives, a job for which he had not been paid. He said he looked for work with other tire companies during that time, but had not been able to find anything. The claimant said, and the evidence confirms, that his doctor imposed lifting restrictions which were removed on November 2nd.
On appeal, claimant contends the hearing officer erred in determining the claimant was not injured in the course and scope of his employment, did not report an injury to his employer within 30 days, and did not have disability from any alleged injury. The claimant contends that his own testimony about the manner in which he was injured is uncontroverted, and the hearing officer incorrectly relied on the statements of Mr. D, who did not recall that claimant had been injured, and Mr. G, who had little contact with claimant and who was not working on March 21st. The claimant also says the evidence shows his disability began on August 31st, 1992, and continued until November 2.
The claimant in a workers’ compensation proceeding has the burden of proof to establish that he sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). While it is true that the claimant’s testimony was uncontroverted concerning experiencing pain as he lifted a tire on March 21st and subsequently discovering a bulge, his testimony, as an interested party, raised only a question of fact. Presley v. Royal Indemnity Insurance Co., 557 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, Article 8308-6.34(e). She could have given more weight to the testimony of Mr. D, who implied that he would have remembered any report of a work-related injury, and to that of Mr. G, who investigated the incident and found no other employee who knew about it. While different inferences may have been drawn from the evidence than were drawn by the hearing officer, this is not, in and of itself, a sound basis on which to reverse the decision of the fact finder. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92113, decided May 7, 1992. We do not find that the hearing officer’s decision was so against the great weight or preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust and unfair. In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1951).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are accordingly affirmed.
Lynda H. Nesenholtz – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge