This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01-11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, on May 21, 1993. The issues as agreed to by the parties were as follows: whether the claimant’s infection with meningitis arose in the course and scope of her employment; whether the claimant notified the employer of the occupational disease within 30 days of the date the claimant knew or should have known of the existence of the occupational disease; whether the claimant had disability as a result of the occupational disease and, if so, for what period of time. The appellant, who is the claimant, appeals the decision of hearing officer (hearing officer) that she did not have an occupational injury in the course and scope of her employment. She contends that certain of the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are manifestly unjust and contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and requests this panel to reverse and render a decision in her favor. She alternatively contends that the record is incomplete and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
DECISION
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The claimant was working as an infant care coordinator for the (employer), a day care center, on (date of injury). As such, she was responsible for the care of five infants. On the day in question, she developed a severe headache while at work and was taken to Humana Hospital. She said she was given medication and released, but later returned because of continued pain. She was hospitalized for several days, during which time she was diagnosed with acute viral meningitis. The claimant said she was off work for approximately three months, after which time she returned. Shortly after she returned, she was told by her supervisor that an infant named Joseph had also contracted meningitis. The claimant did not know when Joseph had become ill, but said that it was some time after she had. She estimated that Joseph was one-month-old at the time she became ill. She testified that she informed her employer that her disease was work related after she returned to work and found out about Joseph; however, she also testified that her doctor, (Dr. E), had told her about two weeks after she was released from the hospital that she could have contracted the disease from an infant at work. Her claim for compensation was filed (date).
The claimant said she returned to work in August or September 1991 (although the hearing officer notes that employer’s records show she returned on July 23rd). She said she worked approximately a week (although employer’s records show her working until February 28, 1992) but said she had to quit because she had a phobia about contracting a disease from one of the children. In light of her fears, she said her family doctor, Dr Eadvised her not to return to work. She has not worked since that time. Medical records show she continued to see Dr. E for migraine headaches. Claimant was expecting a baby at the time of the hearing, which was due two months later; she said bed rest had been advised for the previous two months.
In response to an inquiry from the carrier, Dr. E wrote on February 8, 1992, as follows:
1.As indicated by the diagnosis, Viral Meningitis is caused by a virus infection.
2.The contraction of viral meningitis by [claimant] is not related to her employment.
3.There is no relationship between migraines and viral meningitis.
The 1989 Act provides that the term “injury” includes occupational diseases. Article 8308-1.03(27). “Occupational disease” is defined as “a disease arising out of and in the course of employment that causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body.” The term, however, does not include an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of employment, unless the disease is incident to a compensable injury. Article 8308-1.03(36).
Excluding an ordinary disease of life from the category of injuries has been held to indicate a legislative intent to require evidence of probative force of a causal connection between employment and occupational diseases. Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 533 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Causation may be proved by testimony of experts which establishes a reasonable probability of a causal connection between employment and the injury; however, in the absence of reasonable probability, the inference of causation amounts to no more than conjecture or speculation. Schaefer v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 612 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1981), and cases cited therein.
Schaefer involved a claimant who contracted a certain strain of tuberculosis, allegedly from working in soil contaminated by animal feces. The court held that there was no evidence linking that disease with the soil in which claimant worked, where claimant’s doctor merely suggested a possibility regarding how or when claimant was exposed; it also stated that the fact that claimant’s disease was extremely rare did not exclude it from being a disease to which the general public is exposed outside of employment. See also Home Insurance Co. v. Davis, 642 S.W.2d 268 (Civ. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (claimant’s chronic bronchitis not compensable where evidence showed it was just as likely it could have been caused by cigarettes as by his employment); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92085, decided April 16, 1992 (claimant’s hepatitis held noncompensable where no expert testimony on causation adduced).
We believe that the evidence in this case supports the hearing officer’s finding that there was no medical evidence to show the nature and source of the claimant’s meningitis. The claimant disputes the hearing officer’s characterization of certain evidence, including whether the infant Joseph contracted meningitis before claimant did, and the statement of Dr. E concerning the relationship between claimant’s migraines and meningitis and his statement that claimant’s disease was not work related. With regard to the latter statement, claimant points out that Dr. E was responding to questions from the carrier without any independent knowledge that there was an infant at employer’s center with meningitis. While the foregoing may indeed be true, the fact remains that the record contains no evidence which affirmatively links claimant’s illness to her employment. In absence of such, we agree with the hearing officer that claimant has not met her burden of proof. We also find no reason to remand this case for further evidence to be adduced.
The hearing officer’s decision is accordingly affirmed.
Lynda H. Nesenholtz – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge