This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act) (formerly V.A.C.S., Article 8308-1.01 et seq.). On August 2, 1993, a contested case hearing (CCH) was held in (city), Texas, with (hearing officer) presiding as hearing officer. The sole issue at the CCH was appellant’s (claimant herein) impairment rating. The hearing officer found that claimant’s impairment rating was seven percent based upon the certification of a designated doctor selected by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The claimant appeals arguing that the 30% impairment rating given by her treating doctor should have been adopted by the hearing officer. The respondent (carrier herein) filed no response to the claimant’s request for review.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm.
The facts of the case are undisputed and all the evidence submitted at the CCH was by way of stipulation and documents. The claimant was injured on (date of injury). (Dr. N), a neurosurgeon and claimant’s treating doctor, certified on a Report of Medical Evaluation (TWCC-69) that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on May 26, 1993, with a 30% impairment rating. Since the carrier disputed the impairment rating, the Commission selected (Dr. M), M.D., to be the designated doctor. Dr. M certified on a TWCC-69 that the claimant had reached MMI on May 26, 1993, with a seven percent impairment rating.
The only issue on appeal is whether the hearing officer erred in finding that the claimant’s correct impairment rating was seven percent.
Section 408.125(e) provides in relevant part:
If the designated doctor is chosen by the commission, the report of the designated doctor shall have presumptive weight, and the commission shall base the impairment rating on that report unless the great weight of the other medical evidence is to the contrary.
We have previously discussed the meaning of “the great weight of the other medical evidence” in numerous cases. We have held that it is not just equally balancing the evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that can overcome the presumptive weight given to the designated doctor’s report. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992. We have also held that no other doctor’s report, including the report of the treating doctor, is accorded the special, presumptive status accorded to the report of the designated doctor. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92366, decided September 10, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93825, decided October 15, 1993.
Whether the great weight of the other medical evidence was contrary to the opinion of the designated doctor is basically a factual determination. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93459, decided July 15, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the hearing officer is affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge