This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on December 6, 1995, in ______, Texas, with ________ presiding as hearing officer. He determined that the respondent’s (claimant) impairment rating (IR) was 34% as certified by a Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission)-selected designated doctor. The appellant (carrier) appeals urging that the designated doctor misdiagnosed the injury and that his rating is against the great weight of the other medical evidence. The claimant responds that the evidence sufficiently supports the determination of the hearing officer and asks that the decision be affirmed.
DECISION
Affirmed.
Although this case involves a very difficult situation concerning the claimant’s work-related injury, the single issue before the hearing officer was the claimant’s IR. The claimant, a 20-year secretary, has not worked for several years as a result of a debilitating wrist and arm condition. She has been seen by numerous doctors and undergone various treatments during this period of time. Unfortunately, the diagnoses have varied as much as the doctors, and this is set out in the hearing officer’s Decision and Order. Clearly, there is significant difference in medical opinion reflected in the record. In any event, the claimant’s treating doctor, who had diagnosed wrist sprain, rendered an IR of 15%. The carrier disputed this and a Commission-selected designated doctor subsequently examined the claimant and the various medical records. He rendered an IR of 34% and indicated his diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the upper extremities. The carrier subsequently had a peer review by their selected doctor who disagreed with the diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy and basically agreed with the treating doctor’s 15% IR except that he found the treating doctor’s figures should have come out to 14%. At the CCH, the treating doctor testified by telephone conference call and indicated that he had reviewed the designated doctor’s report and that he agreed with it.
Although the biggest problem in this case appeared to be determining what injury the claimant suffered, there seemed little doubt that the claimant’s condition was rather severe. In this regard, the hearing officer accepted the diagnostic basis for the designated doctor’s IR, while acknowledging that only the IR was entitled to presumptive weight and not the diagnosis. While there was certainly conflict in the medical evidence as to the injury, we have no basis to conclude that the hearing officer’s determination was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Employers Casualty Co. v. Hutchinson, 814 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ). Clearly, the hearing officer is the one to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). Under the circumstances present here, accepting the injury diagnosed by the designated doctor, we cannot say the hearing officer erred in according presumptive weight to the designated doctor’s IR and determining that the great weight of other medical evidence was not contrary thereto. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992; Section 408.125(e). Accordingly, the decision and order are affirmed.
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge