This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 18 and November 21, 1996. With regard to the issues at the CCH, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain an occupational disease injury, that the date of injury is ______, that she provided timely notice of her injury to (employer), that the respondent (carrier) timely contested the compensability of her injury, that she timely filed an Employee’s Notice of Injury or Occupational Disease & Claim for Compensation (TWCC-41) with the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission), and that she did not have disability from June 1, 1994, to June 8, 1996. The claimant appeals the compensability issue only, seeking reversal, and the carrier responds, seeking affirmance. The carrier does not appeal any issue. Therefore, the hearing officer’s determinations with respect to the date of injury, notice to the employer, carrier’s contest of compensability, timely filing, and disability issues became final by operation of law. Section 410.169.
DECISION
We affirm.
The claimant testified at the CCH that her work on the employer’s “box lines,” inside its building, subjected her to carbon monoxide gas from delivery truck exhaust and paint fumes. She maintains that the employer’s delivery vehicles were parked inside the building while boxes were unloaded and loaded and that maintenance personnel applied touch-up paint to the vehicles inside the building. She said the exhaust fans were inoperative. Mr. W, the employer’s health and safety manager, testified that 48 exhaust fans were installed in the walls and the roof of the building on August 10, 1990. He explained that the fans were on timers so as to ventilate the building when the delivery vehicles were in the building. He stated that, although there was carbon monoxide inside the building, OSHA tested the air on September 14, 1994, and the amount of carbon monoxide was within its permissible exposure limits.
Dr. P, a neurologist, in his August 10, 1994, report, diagnoses the claimant with spasmodic dysphonia and advises her not to be exposed to respiratory irritants. On December 20, 1994, he releases her to return to work that does not involve exposure to chemical fumes or dust. Dr. DO, an otorhinolaryngologist (head, ear, nose and throat doctor), in his November 7, 1995, report states that the “etiology of this disorder [spasmodic dysphonia] appears to be multifactorial and is not completely understood.” The claimant’s family doctor, Dr. G, referred her to Dr. DI, who, in his April 15, 1996, report, states “[w]e cannot show that the exposure to chemicals caused the development of her symptoms, however, the timing of onset of her symptoms certainly correlates to her period of exposure.” The hearing officer found that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence does not establish in reasonable medical probability that the claimant’s spasmodic dysphonia condition is a result of her employment at [the employer].” The claimant argues on appeal that the medical evidence in the record “is strongly supportive of the relationship” between and “clearly links” her workplace at the employer with her “vocal cord spasmodic dysphonia.”
An occupational disease is “a disease arising out of and in the course and scope of employment that causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body . . .” Section 401.011(34). It “does not include an ordinary disease of life to which the public is exposed outside of employment, unless that disease is an incident to a compensable injury or occupational disease.” Id. An employee must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the compensability of an occupational disease. The necessary causal connection between the particular disease in this case and the workplace must be established by expert medical evidence, to a reasonable medical probability. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 960582, decided May 2, 1996, citing Schaefer v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, 612 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1980).
The decision reflects that the hearing officer had serious reservations about the claimant’s credibility. She comments therein that the claimant originally denied any exposure to chemicals prior to starting her employment with the employer in 1990, but then recanted and admitted to being exposed to chemicals in cleaning agents when she was employed cleaning offices. Also, the claimant first denied being diagnosed with any respiratory ailments prior to 1990 then later admitted to being diagnosed with “respiratory distress syndrome” in 1988 from exposure to toxic fumes between 1986 and 1988. The hearing officer also comments that the claimant obviously did not share her exposures prior to 1990 with several of her physicians.
The contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). As an appeals body, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer when the determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950456, decided May 9, 1995. We conclude that the hearing officer’s determination as to the compensability of the claimant’s alleged occupational disease is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.
The decision is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, we affirm.
Christopher L. Rhodes – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge