This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). On April 2, 1997, a contested case hearing (CCH) was held. The record was held open until April 21, 1997, for additional evidence. The issue at the CCH was whether the appellant, who is the claimant, sustained a compensable injury on _____.
The hearing officer determined that the claimant had not sustained a compensable injury and that his angina attack was precipitated by his preexisting heart disease and did not arise out of the course and scope of employment.
The claimant appeals, arguing that he met his burden of proof. The carrier asks that the decision be affirmed.
DECISION
Affirmed.
Claimant was employed as a casualty claims adjuster for (employer), and contended that his attack of angina on _____, after which he was unable to return to work, was brought about by a stressful encounter with his supervisors on __________, in which he was told he would have to improve or be terminated.
It was undisputed, and admitted by the claimant, that he had had a heart attack (myocardial infarction) on February 12, 1994, and was under continuing treatment for coronary artery disease. This is established also by medical records in evidence. Claimant was advised to lose weight, exercise, avoid temperature extremes, and generally seek to avoid stress, but did not comply, contending that it would not have been possible to comply with all of these recommendations in his job.
Claimant indicated his job was generally stressful, because of the need to commute and drive over a large geographical territory in South Texas, and that his requests for assistance over the years had not been credited.
Claimant stated that on __________, during an adjusters conference, he was called into a meeting with his immediate supervisor and a company supervisor and told by his immediate supervisor that if he did not improve his performance in 90 days, he would be terminated. The meeting lasted approximately half an hour. Claimant indicated that this took him completely by surprise; however, conflicting evidence was brought forward that claimant had been advised of a few certain specific complaints previously. The extent and duration of any previous concerns was conflicting, with claimant asserting that with two exceptions, any previous discussions concerned generalities rather than specifics. In any case, claimant stated that after this meeting, he continued to perform his regular job, but worried what he would do if he were terminated, given what he perceived as the difficulty in finding another job at the age of 60.
The morning of ______, claimant had left-sided chest and arm pain and went to the doctor. Claimant went to the hospital with upper left clavicle pain on______, which was ultimately diagnosed after testing and hospitalization as an attack of unstable angina. Claimant stated that there was no doubt in his mind that this stemmed from his disciplinary meeting three days prior, and that he had never before had an angina attack. Claimant did not assert that there was any physical exertion that brought about the attack.
The claimant identified his primary treating physician as Dr. M, and agreed that neither Dr. M nor referral physicians could say, one way or the other, that his attack resulted from the disciplinary meeting three days earlier. Claimant said that Dr. M indicated that the stress from that interview “may” have brought on the angina. This is borne out by Dr. M’s June 20, 1996, letter, in which he stated that heart disease was progressive, and that angina was due to ischemia of the heart muscle which was usually caused by coronary artery disease. Noting that studies indicated that there could be a relationship between psychological stress and occurrences of ischemia, he stated that this “may” have occurred in claimant’s case. However, Dr. M also completed physician’s statements in May and September 1996 in which he stated that claimant’s condition was not due to his employment.
We first note that the hearing officer discussed the mental trauma statute but rejected it as inapplicable to this case. However, it appears to us that where the theory of recovery is that the claimed injury resulted not at all due to physical means, but flowed solely from an emotionally stressful event, that the claim is essentially a mental trauma injury claim, and the hearing officer need not have shied away from applying this statute. This case is therefore distinguishable from Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 962405, decided January 9, 1997, an unpublished case cited by the hearing officer as the basis for rejecting a mental trauma analysis; that case involved a claim for physical injuries from a fall after a stressful meeting. As the hearing officer noted, mental trauma arising from a legitimate personnel action of the type described in this case is not compensable. Section 408.006(b); Marsh v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island, 788 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
That being said, we nevertheless find sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s decision that the claimant failed to establish the causal connection between his work and his angina attack, and that the angina was more likely the result of his preexisting heart disease rather than being told to improve his performance. We do not agree with the claimant’s assertion on appeal that the hearing officer has based his determination on any finding that claimant’s heart disease and resulting angina was an ordinary disease of life, so much as an analysis that claimant failed to present sufficient medical evidence to establish by a preponderance the causal connection to the disciplinary conference.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, the materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). We do not agree that his decision is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly wrong or unjust, and affirm his decision and order.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge