This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was commenced on May 22, 1997, with the record closing on June 16, 1997. (Hearing officer) presided as hearing officer. The issues at the CCH were: (1) Did the respondent (claimant) sustain a compensable injury on Injury 2, or are her present problems a continuation of her prior injury, and (2) Did the claimant have disability resulting from the injury sustained on Injury 2. The hearing officer found that the claimant sustained a new injury in the form of an aggravation of her underlying condition on Injury 2, and, as a result of this injury, had disability beginning on November 14, 1996, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (self-insured) argues that there was no change in the claimant’s MRIs before and after the claimant’s alleged Injury 2, injury and the hearing officer should have rejected the opinions of the claimant’s doctors that she suffered a new injury. There is no response from the claimant in the appeals file.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The claimant testified that she suffered an injury when she was operating a floor buffer on Injury 2, while working for the self-insured as a custodian. The claimant testified that she injured her back, shoulder and wrist. The claimant compared the level of pain she experienced at the time of this injury as akin to labor pain.
The claimant testified that she had worked for the self-insured since 1987. The claimant had a back injury in Injury 1 for which she underwent conservative treatment. An MRI in March 1995 revealed the claimant had “moderate disc herniation at the L4-5 level which impinged on the ventral aspect of the thecal sac, just below the disc space.” The claimant underwent a second MRI scan of the lumbar spine on November 26, 1996, which showed “a moderate posterocentral L5-S1 disc protrusion.” The claimant’s medical records indicate that she has a congenital spinal defect, which led to some confusion about the proper nomenclature to use concerning her disc levels. It appears that the levels referred to in the quotations above from the two MRIs were, in fact, the same level.
On February 12, 1997, the claimant underwent a laminectomy and fusion. This surgery had been recommended in 1995, but at the time the claimant decided to continue to pursue conservative treatment. The claimant testified that during the 18 months prior to her Injury 2, injury she worked without absence. The carrier’s consulting expert, Dr. Su, a radiologist, stated in his report that there was, in his opinion, essentially no difference between the claimant’s 1995 and 1996 MRIs. Based upon that he concluded the claimant did not suffer a new injury on Injury 2. The two surgeons who performed the surgery–Dr. S, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. P, a neurosurgeon–disagreed with Dr. Su and stated that the Injury 2, injury aggravated the claimant’s previous herniation. Dr. P also opined that the 1996 MRI showed a larger herniation than the 1995 MRI.
The hearing officer found that the claimant suffered a new injury on Injury 2, in the form of an aggravation of her underlying condition. The carrier appeals this determination as being contrary to the great weight of the evidence and argues that the MRIs contradict the opinions of Dr. S and Dr. P.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
First, we note that the factual testimony of the claimant alone can be sufficient to establish injury, even if contradicted by medical experts. Maryland Casualty Company v. Davis, 464 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e). We have specifically stated as follows in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950128, decided March 13, 1995:
The Appeals Panel has held that medical evidence is only required to establish causation where the link to work is beyond the common experience which did not include a back injury and lifting. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94278, decided April 12, 1994.
Thus, the testimony of the claimant that she suffered a back injury was sufficient to support the hearing officer’s finding of injury.
In any case, there was medical evidence from both Dr. S and Dr. P that the claimant suffered an injury. While there was conflicting medical evidence from Dr. Su, weighing conflicting evidence was the province of the hearing officer. While the carrier argues that the MRIs support Dr. Su’s opinion over the opinions of Dr. S and Dr. P, it would be more accurate to say that Dr. Su and Dr. P differed in their reading of the MRIs and the hearing officer certainly was not bound to accept Dr. Su’s interpretation of the MRIs.
The carrier’s attack on the hearing officer’s disability finding was premised on its challenge of the injury finding. Finding sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s injury finding we also affirm the hearing officer’s disability finding.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge
Judy L. Stephens – Appeals Judge