This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on November 20, 1998. The issues at the CCH were whether the appellant (claimant) was entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBS) for the 11th compensable quarter and what were the claimant’s earnings to be used to determine the monthly SIBS rate for the 11th compensable quarter. The hearing officer determined that the claimant was not entitled to SIBS for the 11th compensable quarter and that during the filing period for the 11th compensable quarter the claimant earned wages in the amount of $195.50. The claimant challenges the hearing officer’s determination that he was not entitled to SIBS for the quarter in question and also argues that the hearing officer’s fact findings concerning his ability to return to his preinjury occupation, his failure to make a good faith job search and his underemployment not being a direct result of his impairment were contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (self-insured) replies that the findings and decision of the hearing officer were sufficiently supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The parties stipulated that on ___________, the claimant sustained a compensable low back injury; that claimant has a 19% impairment rating (IR); that the claimant did not commute any portion of his impairment income benefits (IIBS); and that the 11th quarter ran from August 12 through November 10, 1998.
The claimant testified that he was unable to return to his preinjury employment as a waste water treatment operator for the self-insured. On March 4, 1997, the claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation which indicated that he could perform medium-duty work, which was defined as including being able to lift 50 pounds infrequently. Also in evidence was a job description for the claimant’s job with the self-insured. In addition, Dr. S, M.D., the claimant’s treating doctor, made the following statement in a letter dated March 25, 1997:
Historically, [the claimant] said that in his place of employment even when his job was described as being heavy, he never had to lift, without assistance, over 30 pounds or so.
Dr. L, M.D., the self-insured’s doctor, stated as follows in a medical report of May 26, 1998:
In my opinion, there is no contraindication to [the claimant] returning to work as a plant operator, were he so inclined. He, of course, is interested in a retraining program. I do not feel activity restriction is required in [claimant’s] case at this point in time.
The claimant testified that he was enrolled in some classes during the filing period for the 11th compensable quarter under the auspices of the Texas Rehabilitation Commission. The claimant also testified that during the filing periods he sought employment with 25 different employers. The carrier’s vocational expert testified that she checked these contacts and was unable to verify a number of them.
Section 408.142(a) outlines the requirements for SIBS eligibility as follows:
An employee is entitled to [SIBS] if on the expiration of the [IIBS] period computed under Section 408.121(a)(1) the employee:
(1)has an [IR] of 15 percent or more as determined by this subtitle from the compensable injury;
(2)has not returned to work or has returned to work earning less than 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage as a direct result of the employee’s impairment;
(3)has not elected to commute a portion of the [IIBS] under Section 408.128; and
(4)has attempted in good faith to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work.
The fact that the claimant met the first and third of these requirements was established by stipulation. This case revolved around whether the claimant met the second and fourth of these requirements. We have previously held that both the question of whether the claimant made a good faith job search and whether the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of his impairment are questions of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94150, decided March 22, 1994; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94533, decided June 14, 1994.
Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
Applying this standard, we cannot say that the hearing officer erred in her factual findings that the claimant’s underemployment during the filing period for the 11th compensable quarter was not a direct result of his impairment and that the claimant failed to make a good faith job search were not supported by sufficient evidence. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge