This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 19, 1999. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS); that the date of injury is ____________; that the claimant timely reported her injury to her employer; that she timely filed her Employee’s Notice of Injury or Occupational Disease & Claim for Compensation (TWCC-41); and that she had disability as a result of her compensable injury from February 2, 1999, through the date of the hearing, August 19, 1999. In its appeal, the appellant (carrier) challenges each of those determinations as being against the great weight of the evidence. In her response, the claimant urges affirmance; however, she acknowledges that she worked light duty for the employer from April 6 to July 2, 1999, and that she did not claim disability for that period.
DECISION
Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The claimant testified that in August 1997 she began working as a customer service representative for (employer). She stated that she handled a variety of customer telephone calls and that her duties required her to perform repetitive data entry on the computer to track packages, schedule pickups, open claims for lost packages and other similar services. The parties stipulated that on ____________, the claimant reported her alleged injury to her employer and that she filed her TWCC-41 on February 4, 1999.
The claimant stated that about six months to a year before she reported her injury, she began to notice numbness and tingling in her hands. The claimant delivered a baby on April 7, 1998. Following her maternity leave, the claimant returned to work part time, at her request. She stated that she had numbness in both her arms and legs during her pregnancy and that the problems with her legs went away after she gave birth but the problems with her arms/hands continued. She stated that on ____________, she saw (Ms. C) at work and Ms. C was wearing a wrist splint. The claimant stated that she asked Ms. C what was wrong and Ms. C told her that she had CTS and described symptoms similar to those the claimant had been suffering. The claimant stated that during her conversation with Ms. C she first thought that the problems she was having in her arms/hands may be related to work.
The claimant initially treated with (Dr. B), her primary care physician, on January 26, 1999. Dr. B diagnosed “early [CTS].” In a letter of May 1, 1999, Dr. B noted that pregnancy is known to affect CTS; however, he further stated:
[Claimant] did not develop the [CTS] while she was pregnant, but subsequently while she was breast feeding. The patient does give the history [of] repetitive hand motion which is what would be expected to cause the [CTS].
The claimant subsequently began treating with (Dr. E), a chiropractor. In a letter dated April 14, 1999, Dr. E diagnosed bilateral CTS and stated that “[t]hese symptoms have been attributed to chronic overuse of the wrist and finger flexor, from typing.” In a July 8, 1999, letter, Dr. E opined that the claimant “is suffering from a repetitive microtrauma as induced from chronic overuse, and not from pregnancy induced edema.” Finally, the claimant introduced a July 8, 1999, memorandum from (Dr. W), her obstetrician. Dr. W stated that he did “not feel her [CTS] is a result of her pregnancy.”
The carrier introduced a report from (Dr. S), who reviewed a videotape of several different employees performing the job the claimant performed for the employer. Dr. S opined that the job depicted did not involve sufficient repetitively traumatic activities to have caused CTS.
The claimant in a workers’ compensation case has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165. The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what weight to give to the evidence. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Generally, injury may be proven by the testimony of the claimant alone, if it is believed by the hearing officer. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). However, the testimony of a claimant as an interested party raises only an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
The carrier contends that the hearing officer’s injury and date-of-injury determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In so arguing, the carrier emphasized the same factors it had emphasized at the hearing. The significance, if any, of those factors was a matter left to the hearing officer in determining whether the claimant had sustained her burden of proving that she sustained an injury and the date of any such injury. The hearing officer resolved the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the claimant and he was acting within his province as the fact finder in so doing. Our review of the record does not demonstrate that the challenged determinations are so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the injury or date-of-injury determinations on appeal. Cain; Pool. Likewise, the fact that another fact finder may well have drawn different inferences from the evidence, which would have supported a different result, does not provide a basis for us to disturb the hearing officer’s decision. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Given our affirmance of the hearing officer’s determination that the date of injury of the claimant’s occupational disease injury is ____________, we likewise affirm his determinations that the claimant timely reported her injury and that she timely filed her claim. The parties stipulated that the claimant reported her injury to her employer on ____________, and that she filed her claim on February 4, 1999, well within the 30-day and one-year periods provided for doing so in Sections 409.001 and 409.003, respectively.
Next, we consider the carrier’s challenge to the hearing officer’s disability determination. Dr. E placed the claimant on light duty in February 1999 and had continued her in that status through the date of the hearing. At first the employer did not have a light-duty position for the claimant. However, it is undisputed that she worked light duty at her regular wage for a similar number of hours per week as she worked before her injury from April 6 to July 2, 1999. On July 2, 1999, the claimant’s light-duty position ended with the employer, apparently based on the employer’s policy of not permitting an employee to work in a light-duty position for more than 90 days. The claimant testified that she has not worked since July 2, 1999, except that she has become a sales representative for a company that sells kitchen utensils through in-home demonstrations and parties. The hearing officer found that the claimant had disability from February 2, 1999, through the date of the hearing. The claimant acknowledged that she was able to make wages equivalent to her preinjury wage for the period from April 6 to July 2, 1999, when she worked in a light-duty position with the employer. Thus, the hearing officer’s determination that she had disability in that period is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. However, the medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony sufficiently support the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant had disability for the periods from February 2 to April 5, 1999, and from July 3 to August 19, 1999. As so modified, the hearing officer’s disability determination is not so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to compel its reversal.
Finally, the carrier asserts that the hearing officer erred in admitting Claimant’s Exhibit No. 6, the report from Dr. W, the claimant’s obstetrician, opining that her CTS was not caused by her pregnancy, arguing that the report was not timely exchanged. The hearing officer admitted that document because he determined that the claimant had exercised due diligence in obtaining the report and exchanged it as soon as possible after it became available. We find no abuse of discretion in the hearing officer’s having so found. Nonetheless, we further note that in order to obtain a reversal for the admission of evidence, the carrier must demonstrate that the evidence was actually erroneously admitted and that “the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment.” Hernandez v. Hernandez, 611 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). It has also been held that reversible error is not ordinarily shown in connection with rulings on questions of evidence unless the whole case turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In this instance, any error in the admission of the claimant’s exhibit simply does not rise to the level of reversible error because both Dr. B and Dr. E also opined that the claimant’s CTS was caused by her repetitive activities at work rather than her pregnancy. As a result, we cannot agree that the admission of Dr. W’s report was reasonably calculated to, and probably did, cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Accordingly, any evidentiary error was harmless and would not provide a basis for reversing the decision and order on appeal.
The hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant sustained a compensable occupational disease injury, that the date of injury is ____________, and that she timely reported her injury and timely filed her claim are affirmed. The hearing officer’s disability determination is reversed and a new decision rendered that the claimant had disability from February 2 to April 5, 1999, and from July 3, 1999, through the date of the hearing on August 19, 1999.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge