Your FREE and easy resource for all things Texas workers' compensation
At a Glance:
Title:
Angeles v. City of Houston
Date:
January 2, 1992
Citation:
01-90-01176-CV
Status:
Unpublished Opinion

Angeles v. City of Houston

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Genaro ANGELES and Maria Del Socorro Angeles, Appellants,

v.

The CITY of HOUSTON, Appellee.

No. 01-90-01176-CV.

|

Jan. 2, 1992.

On Appeal from the 280th District Court Harris County, Trial Court Cause No. 88-49330.

Before SAM BASS, HUGHES and DUNN, JJ.

HUGHES, Justice

OPINION

*1 We are asked to determine whether, in this workers’ compensation case, the trial court erred in granting the City of Houston’s motion for instructed verdict.

Jose Francisco Angeles was an employee of the City’s Parks and Recreation Department. In September 1987, he was shot to death by Reynaldo Rodriquez. He is survived by his parents, Genaro Angeles and Maria Del Socorro Angeles. On August 16, 1988, the Texas Industrial Accident Board made an award to the Angeleses. The City appealed to the trial court, the Angeleses filed a counterclaim, and the parties were realigned to reflect their true position. At the conclusion of the Angeles’ case in chief, the trial court granted the City’s motion for instructed verdict.

The Angeleses bring two points of error, asserting that the trial court erred in granting the City’s motion for instructed verdict because: 1) the evidence amply raised fact questions for the jury regarding whether the decedent was injured during the course of his employment; and 2) the Angeleses raised sufficient evidence, regarding the scope of employment issue, to shift the burden of proof to the City on that issue.

An employee who sustains an injury during the course of his employment is to be compensated pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. Deatherage v. International Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. 1981).

In this case, Melvin Lang Mott, the decedent’s supervisor, was the sole witness called to testify. Mott testified that he is the Park Director of the Montie Beach Park, and has been so since 1980. Further, he stated: 1) the decedent had been employed as a recreational aide for a year before he was shot; 2) the decedent was employed on a permanent part-time basis; 3) the decedent’s responsibilities included conducting activities inside and outside of the recreational center, and monitoring the programs to insure that they ran smoothly; 4) on the day that he was shot, the decedent reported to work between the hours of 3:00 and 3:30 p. m.; 5) the decedent was scheduled to work six hours on that date; 6) Mott left the park around 5:00 p.m., leaving the decedent as the only employee at the park; and 7) later that evening an individual telephoned Mott, informing him that decedent had been shot.

*2 Mott testified that he has no personal knowledge regarding the location of the shooting. He was not asked whether he knew the time the shooting occurred, or whether he recalled the time he received the telephone call. Therefore, there was no evidence that the shooting occurred during working hours.

Pursuant to article 8306 Sec. 3, an injury sustained during the course of employment specifically does not include:

An injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment

Furthermore, the burden was on the Angeleses to prove the injury was work related. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983).

In this case, the Angeleses failed to put on any evidence that Rodriguez’s actions were directed against the decedent as a park employee, or the shooting occurred during the time decedent was working. Consequently, they failed to meet their burden. Appellant’s two points of error are overruled.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 90.

Footnotes

1

Act of May, 1983 5, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 131, Sec. 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 613, repealed by Act. of December 13, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch 1, Sec. 16. 01(7), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 114, effective January 1, 1991.

End of Document
Top