Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Jessica FOWLER, For Herself And as next friend of Jaqulynn Fowler, a minor child; Debra Rowinsky, as next friend of her minor child, Emily Rowinsky; Mary Doe, as next friend of her minor child, Jane Doe; and for all those similarly situated, Appellants

v.

BRYAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Sarah Ashburn, Superintendent of Bryan Independent School District; Randy Caperton, Vice-principal of Sam Rayburn Middle School; Sandra Petty, Former Vice-principal of Rayburn Middle School; Jay Anding, Assistant Director of Transportation; Bob Owens, Bus Driver; and Their Employees, Agents, and all those acting in concert with them at their direction, Appellees

No. 01-97-01001-cv.

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July 2, 1998.

On Appeal from the 361st District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 44,241-361

Panel consists of Justices MIRABAL, WILSON, and TAFT.

OPINION

MARGARET GARNER MIRABAL, Justice.

*1 Appellants, former and current students at Bryan Independent School District (BISD), appeal from a summary judgment. We consider whether the students’ claims under the Texas Equal Rights Amendment¹ (ERA) and chapter 106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code² for peer hostile environment sexual harassment are moot. We affirm the summary judgment.

I. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper for a defendant if the defendant establishes, as a matter of law, there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997). A defendant may also obtain summary judgment by conclusively establishing all elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. Id. In reviewing the rendering of summary judgment, we assume all evidence favorable to the nonmovant is true, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any reasonable doubt in its favor. Id.

II. Background

The following facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the students.³

A. Jessica and Jaqulynn

During the 1991-1993 school years, Jessica and Jaqulynn Fowler attended Sam Rayburn Middle School in BISD. They rode school bus number one to and from school. Starting during the 1991-1992 school year, male students, including GS (who attended another BISD school), physically and verbally abused Jessica, Jaqulynn, and the other girls on bus number one by grabbing their breasts, slapping their bottoms, and calling them names, such as “whores,” “bitches,” and “sluts.” By September 1992, GS’s misbehavior escalated to include grabbing Jessica’s and Jaqulynn’s genital area.

Jaqulynn and other girls complained numerous times of GS’s assaults to appellee Bob Owens, bus number one’s driver. While Owens took down names, Jaqulynn and Jessica eventually stopped reporting because they did not perceive any good came from it. Jessica reported the incidents to her mother, Debra Rowinsky. Rowinsky told Owens, and Owens said he would look into it and put the behavior to a stop.

On September 24, 1992, GS again grabbed Jessica’s genital area and breasts.⁴ Jessica, Jaqulynn, and their parents visited appellee Randy Caperton, the school’s assistant principal, the next day to tell him of GS’s assaults on girls on bus number one. Rowinsky also informed Caperton that boys regularly slapped girls’ bottoms in the school’s hallways. Caperton called the principal of GS’s school, who suspended GS from riding bus number one for three or five days.⁵ Caperton completed a report of the September 24 incident.

On September 29, 1992, Rowinsky again visited Caperton, asking that GS be removed from bus number one. Caperton, indicating GS had a legal right to ride the bus, declined; instead, he decided that GS would be restricted to the front of the bus until the charges were determined to be true.

*2 GS continued the assaults on Jessica and Jaqulynn on almost a daily basis after his suspension. Owens was nearby but did nothing. GS also violated the seating requirement upon his return, and Owens responded by restricting Jessica and Jaqulynn to the front of the bus.

Rowinsky contacted appellee Jay Anding, BISD’s assistant transportation coordinator, demanding that GS be restricted to sitting behind Owens on the bus because of his continuing behavior. Owens again restricted GS to the front, but only for a few weeks. Rowinsky also told Anding about sexual misconduct toward other girls aboard bus number one, and Anding assured her he would investigate. Anding referred GS’s matter to his school, after which point the investigation and discipline were that school’s responsibility, not Anding’s. Rowinsky also contacted Caperton again to inform him of the continuing assaults against girls aboard bus number one.

Until December 1992, Jessica and Jaqulynn no longer reported harassment because some children had retaliated against them for filing criminal charges against GS. However, in December 1992, another male student, LH, began touching Jessica and Jaqulynn’s bottom and breasts frequently. Jessica reported this to Owens. On December 16, LH reached up Jaqulynn’s skirt, made a crude remark about what he almost touched, and grabbed her genital area; later, he grabbed her bottom. LH also ran his hand up Jessica’s and other girls’ skirts the same day. Jaqulynn reported this to Owens, but he “just stared into space.” LH grabbed Jessica’s bottom repeatedly the next day.⁶

The next day, Rowinsky contacted appellee Dr. Tom Purifoy, BISD’s executive director of secondary education and Title IX⁷ coordinator, and told him of the assaults aboard bus number one. Purifoy referred Rowinsky to C.W. Henry, Anding’s assistant. The next day, after reviewing videotapes from the bus and determining the children were out of control (but not seeing any sexual misconduct), Henry assigned a new driver to replace Owens. There are no further allegations of GS’s harassment after this point.

On January 19, 1993, the new bus driver assigned Jessica a seat next to GS. Although GS made no new assaults on Jessica, Rowinsky removed her daughters from the bus thereafter. Rowinsky again requested that Purifoy remove GS from bus number one, but Purifoy refused without proof of the assaults from juvenile court records. Both Anding and Caperton denied having received sexual harassment complaints from other female students aboard bus number one.

On March 20, 1993, during class, a third male student, FF, reached under Jaqulynn’s blouse and unfastened her bra. The teacher sent both students to appellee Sandra Petty, the school’s vice-principal, who sent Jessica back to class and suspended FF for the rest of the day and the next day.⁸ The next day, Rowinsky visited Petty and complained of FF’s behavior. Petty responded that she did not consider FF’s conduct to be sexual.

*3 Also on March 20, Rowinsky and her attorney met with appellee Dr. Sarah Ashburn, BISD’s superintendent, to complain about GS’s behavior. Ashburn thought the bus suspension sufficed, but promised to investigate.

On May 4, 1993, Rowinsky met again with Ashburn and complained about her failure to take action against GS and LH. Ashburn considered the actions taken against GS sufficient and said BISD did not view the incidents against Jessica and Jaqulynn as assaults and would not take further action. Ashburn further noted that LH was no longer a student in BISD. Rowinsky told Ashburn she intended to file a grievance with the United States Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR).⁹

The Rowinskys removed their three daughters from BISD. However, they would return to BISD if the sexually hostile environment were remedied.

B. Emily Rowinsky

During the 1992-1993 school year, Emily attended fifth grade in BISD. Emily does not allege that she was assaulted or harassed; instead, she simply alleges she left BISD and, like her sisters, would return if the environment changed.

C. Jane Doe

Jane is currently a student in BISD. For about two weeks in September 1995, a group of female students called Jane “virgin” and “vagina” within the teacher’s hearing. The teacher did nothing. Once, Jane became so upset that she left class and campus to call her mother.

Jane and her mother, Mary Doe, met with the teacher and the school principal to report the misbehavior. The mother’s main concern appears to have been that her daughter was able to leave campus without being stopped. The next day, Jane and her mother met with Mr. Watson, another of BISD’s Title IX coordinators. Watson told Jane she could not file a sexual harassment complaint because her antagonizers were female and no touching had occurred. When Jane’s mother later met with Ashburn about the incident, Ashburn echoed Watson’s assessment.

Nonetheless, the school disciplined the girls who had teased Jane by assessing detention and contacting their parents. Additionally, Jane was reassigned from this class so that the taunts would not continue.

D. Procedural History

The students first sued appellees in federal court, alleging violations of Title IX, section 1983,¹⁰ and the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process and equal protection guarantees,¹¹ but reserving the ERA and chapter 106 claims here asserted. The federal district court dismissed the Title IX claims against the individual appellees, dismissed without prejudice the students’ state law claims after declining to accept supplemental jurisdiction over them, and rendered summary judgment in favor of appellees on all remaining claims. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.1996).

The students then filed this suit in Texas district court under the ERA and chapter 106, seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief and costs. The students alleged appellees violated the ERA and chapter 106 by (1) imposing less severe sanctions on offenders committing sexual misconduct than on those committing assault, (2) refusing to investigate complaints of sexual assault and harassment, (3) “grossly mishandling” sexual harassment complaints and refusing to take all necessary steps to correct sexual harassment, and (4) BISD’s not training its employees to correct sexual misconduct.

*4 Appellees moved for summary judgment on the following grounds:

1. claims against BISD were barred by sovereign immunity,

2. claims against individual school officials were barred by qualified and statutory immunity,

3. Jessica and Jaqulynn Fowler were collaterally estopped from asserting their claims,

4. none of the allegations or evidence supported a cause of action under the ERA or chapter 106,

5. the students were not entitled to relief because they lacked standing, their claims were moot, and BISD’s policies complied with or exceeded State law, and

6. the requested injunctive relief was too vague and would require the trial court to micromanage all BISD’s disciplinary measures.

The trial court rendered summary judgment without specifying grounds. The students appeal. When, as here, the summary judgment order does not specify the grounds sustained, we must uphold the summary judgment on any of the movant’s grounds finding support. Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

III. Mootness

Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground the students’ claims were moot because (1) BISD had adopted peer (student-on-student) sexual harassment policies and training after 1993, leaving nothing to enjoin, (2) the students were, therefore, impermissibly seeking to declare past acts unlawful, and (3) Jessica, Jaqulynn, and Emily’s claims were moot because they no longer attended BISD. Under issue “E” of their brief, the students attack the summary judgment’s rendering on mootness grounds.

The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists. Federal Depo. Ins. Corp. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994). If none continues to exist between the parties, we must dismiss the cause. See General Land Office of Texas v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1990).

The summary judgment evidence showed that, during the 1992-1993 school years, BISD distributed to parents and students copies of the student code of conduct, which prohibited making profane, insulting, or threatening remarks; engaging in disruptive conduct; and hazing, harassing, or threatening fellow students. BISD’s official rules of conduct and discipline prohibited similar actions, in addition to prohibiting assaults and inappropriate sexual contact. BISD also maintained a grievance procedure for lodging student and Title IX complaints and designated a Title IX coordinator. BISD publicized its anti-discrimination policies and Title IX coordinators in the newspaper. The students produced summary judgment evidence that peer sexual misconduct occurred during the 1992-1993 year despite these policies and procedures.

However, appellees also produced evidence of policy and procedure changes after the 1992-1993 school year.¹² We set out this evidence in detail. First, beginning in the 1995-1996 school year, BISD distributed to all students in grades six through 12 a pamphlet on teen sexual harassment. The pamphlet set out in detail what peer sexual harassment is, why it is unacceptable, its effects, and distinguished it from flirting and kidding. The pamphlet included an accompanying worksheet on the topic created by BISD. The pamphlet was subsequently distributed to students referred for sexual harassment discipline.

*5 Second, in 1995, BISD added to its discipline management plan provisions specifically addressing peer sexual harassment and misconduct. The discipline plan set out in detail what constituted actionable sexual misconduct and established specific penalties and grievance procedures. The procedures mandated disciplinary action for substantiated peer sexual harassment charges. Beginning the same year, BISD’s teachers specifically referred students to the discipline plan’s peer sexual harassment provisions when the plan was distributed to them. Third, starting in 1995, BISD’s student/parent handbook, which was sent home to parents, expressly addressed peer sexual misconduct and referred the reader to BISD’s Title IX coordinator.

Fourth, by 1996, BISD had begun distributing to all faculty members at the start of each school year a training booklet on sexual harassment. This booklet defined sexual harassment, addressed peer sexual harassment, and set out BISD board policies on and grievance procedures for such harassment. BISD also provided a related training orientation for new employees at the start of each school year. BISD currently holds periodic in-service training seminars on related issues, and some of its employees attend outside seminars on this topic. Finally, BISD central office and campus administrators periodically attend state and national conferences that include sexual harassment prevention training.

In response to appellees’ mootness evidence, the students submitted Jane’s affidavit, the facts of which are detailed above. The students also submitted BISD’s 1993 proposal to OCR for tackling peer sexual harassment, to which BISD agreed after OCR’s 1993 investigation. Appellees’ summary judgment evidence showed BISD had implemented most of these goals by 1997.¹³

The students sought an injunction restraining appellees from (1) failing and refusing to adopt a policy to prevent and punish sexual abuse, misconduct, harassment, and discrimination, (2) failing and refusing properly to discipline those committing these acts, (3) failing and refusing to investigate these complaints, and (4) imposing an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and class members because of their sex. The students also sought a declaration that these acts they sought to enjoin existed. Appellees’ summary judgment evidence established that, since the 1992-1993 scholastic year, BISD has adopted policies and procedures specifically targeting peer sexual misconduct, abuse, and harassment. This is the principal object of the injunction the students seek.

Moreover, appellees demonstrated that BISD now has a procedure for training and educating faculty and students about peer sexual harassment. In response, the students presented evidence of peer sexual misconduct and BISD’s response to it for academic years 1991-1993, before BISD adopted peer sexual harassment education and training. The students’ only evidence of BISD’s atmosphere and the new policy’s effectiveness after 1993 was Jane’s affidavit, which effectively showed the new policy was working, i.e., Jane’s harassers were punished and separated from her. The students presented no other evidence to raise a fact issue after appellees showed BISD had adopted faculty and student training and education under the new peer sexual harassment procedures. A case may become moot when allegedly wrongful behavior has passed and cannot be expected to recur.¹⁴ This is such a case.

*6 The Texas Supreme Court recognizes two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, which are (1) the “capable of repetition” exception and (2) the “collateral consequences” exception.¹⁵ F.D.I.C., 886 S.W.2d at 767. These are discretionary exceptions. See Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). The first exception applies when the challenged act is of such a short duration that the appellant cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot.¹⁶ OXY, 789 S.W.2d at 571. There must be a reasonable expectation that the same controversy involving the same complaining party will recur if not addressed. See Reyna v. Weslaco, 944 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).

The acts challenged here are not of such a short duration that they evade review because (1) the students were elementary and middle school students, with several years to seek redress before graduation and (2) the complained-of acts allegedly continued from 1991 through 1993. Also, BISD’s current peer sexual harassment policies, procedures, training, and education have been in effect for up to four years. While BISD’s board of trustees could theoretically cease these procedures, we find this unlikely, given the detailed structure currently in place. Cf. James v. Round Rock, 630 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, no writ) (holding mootness exception not applicable when superseding ordinance was designed to apply far into future and there was no indication it would be superseded or amended). The validity of any future policy or procedure changes can be challenged at a later date; we are not empowered to decide cases upon future contingencies. See Methodist Hosp. of Dallas v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 874 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (holding expiration of complained-of fee guidelines made declaratory judgment and injunctive relief moot, even though guidelines could later be reenacted). Cf. Camarena v. Texas Employ. Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988) (vacating injunction when state had not yet tried to do complained-of actions under new statute).

Additionally, while appellees have not conceded in court that their actions were unconstitutional, they obviously recognized a problem existed by adopting new policies and procedures to address it. Compare Iranian Muslim Org. v. San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 209 n. 6 (Tex.1981) (in holding case not moot, noting defendant admitted it still would not issue permit appellants sought). This is not a case in which the evidence shows a defendant is continuing (or admits it will continue) the complained-of behavior; here, BISD has adopted the very types of policies and training the students sought. Compare Rowan v. Pickett, 237 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1951, no writ) (holding cause not moot when defendant admitted practices would continue unless enjoined).¹⁷ The “capable of repetition” exception does not apply.

*7 The “collateral consequences” mootness exception applies when the effects of a prejudicial event continue to stigmatize helpless or hated individuals long after an unconstitutional judgment has ceased to operate.¹⁸ OXY, 789 S.W.2d at 571. Here, however, there is simply no judgment or order, like one for involuntary commitment or juvenile delinquency, that will continue to stigmatize the students if not addressed on appeal. Whether the atmosphere at BISD is hostile is another matter. This exception simply does not apply to these facts.

As a final argument that their requested declaratory relief is not moot, the students rely on the general rule that, when a question is one of public interest and of recurrent character, jurisdiction is not lost because a threatened act has become an accomplished fact.¹⁹ This rule is inapposite because (1) the students were not seeking to prevent a future act that came to pass during suit (rather, they sought to stop allegedly on-going acts) and (2) the only “accomplished fact” is the adoption of the sort of peer sexual harassment policies and procedures that the students sought to implement.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for appellees because the students’ claims were moot. Accordingly, we overrule the students’ issue E. Because of our disposition on mootness, we need not reach appellees’ remaining challenges to the judgment.

We affirm the summary judgment.

	Footnotes
1		Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a.
2		Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 106.001-.004 (Vernon 1997).
3		For simplicity’s sake, we refer to appellants (Jessica and Jaqulynn Fowler, Emily Rowinsky, and Jane Doe, along with their parents and next friends who brought suit on their behalf) together as “the students.” We refer to the children individually by their first names. We refer to Debra Rowinsky, mother of three of the child appellants, as “Rowinsky.” We refer to appellees Ashburn, Caperton, Petty, Anding, and Owens together as “the individual appellees.”
4		The Rowinskys filed sexual assault charges against GS based on the incidents aboard bus number one.
5		While the students argue GS’s discipline was too light, the summary judgment evidence shows GS’s bus suspension was in accordance with BISD’s discipline management plan at the time.
6		The summary judgment evidence shows BISD could not take action against LH because he later withdrew from the district.
7		20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1997).
8		The summary judgment evidence shows FF’s discipline was in accordance with BISD’s discipline management plan at the time. The students do not allege FF harassed them further.
9		OCR later investigated and reported 254 “sexual incidents” in BISD during the 1992-1993 year. Female students were about four times more likely to be victims. Although more males than females committed offenses, the report does not show that discipline for any type of sexual incident at any BISD grade level varied depending on whether a boy or girl committed the offense or was the victim. OCR concluded that, while BISD adopted a peer sexual harassment policy for students in the 1993-1994 year, it did not have one before. Therefore, in 1992-1993, BISD disciplinary officials treated sexual incidents as violations of the general discipline code rather than as potential acts of sexual harassment, giving widely varying sanctions. OCR determined BISD failed adequately to respond to the sexual incidents in the 1992-1993 school year, even though it had notice. OCR found BISD had a “sexually hostile environment” that violated Title IX.
10		42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
11		U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
12		The changes instituted since the 1992-1993 academic year largely adopt recommendations from OCR’s 1993 investigation. See also Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 37.083(b) (effective 1995, “Each school district may develop and implement a sexual harassment policy ….” (emphasis added)). BISD entered into an agreement with OCR for corrective action in 1993, after OCR’s report.
13		In a post-submission brief, the students ask us to take judicial notice of a July 1994 letter BISD filed with OCR as part of BISD’s agreement to take corrective action to remedy peer sexual misconduct. This letter is not part of the summary judgment evidence or appellate record. We may not consider it. See Salmon v. Miller, 958 S.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
14		Reyna v. Weslaco, 944 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). Cf. State v. Gibson Prod. Co., 699 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.App.-Waco 1985, no writ) (holding cause may become moot when new legislation supersedes existing legislation during appeal); James v. Round Rock, 630 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, no writ) (same).
15		The students also rely on a third mootness exception-the “public interest” exception-recognized to date by only two Texas courts of appeals, one of which was reversed. See University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ); Nueces County v. Whitley Trucks, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993), rev’d sub. nom Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.1994). This exception allows review of a question of considerable public importance if it can again arise between the same parties or members of the public but, for some reason, evades appellate review. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d at 304. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically declined to decide whether Texas recognizes the “public interest” exception. F.D.I.C., 886 S.W.2d at 767. Because the Supreme Court has recognized only two mootness exceptions to date-and until it acknowledges a third one-we will recognize only two exceptions. See Olson v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 901 S.W.2d 520, 522 n. 2 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (not listing this third exception because Texas Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it is viable).
16		E.g., Iranian Muslim Org. v. San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.1981) (applying exception to short-lived temporary injunction restraining free speech); Texas Educ. Agency v. Stamos, 817 S.W.2d 378, 384 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (applying exception to 6-week administrative action).
17		We find the cases cited by the students distinguishable. In Del Valle Independent School District v. Lopez, the court held a challenge to the constitutionality of a district’s electoral system was not moot even though the district voluntarily abandoned the system, because the board could reimplement the challenged system at any time and had not admitted the system’s unconstitutionality. Id., 863 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). Here, in contrast, BISD has not simply abandoned the challenged policies and procedures. Rather, BISD has replaced them with the types of procedures the students sought and has continued to function under them for two to four years. For the same reason, Lubbock Professional Firefighters v. Lubbock and City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. are also distinguishable. See Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 1074-75, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (holding cause not moot under federal law when defendant voluntarily ceased challenged practice, because no guarantee existed defendant would not reinstate practice and defendant announced it would reinstate same); Lubbock, 742 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding cause not moot even though parties entered into agreement “correcting” challenged grievance procedure, because agreement only temporary and no guarantee existed defendant would make these grievance procedure changes permanent). Texas Pet Foods, Inc. v. State and Alamo Tile Co. v. San Antonio Bar Association are also inapposite because there, the complained-of actions showed a settled course of conduct continuing near trial. See Texas Pet Foods, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Alamo Tile, 360 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Here, in contrast, the evidence shows BISD adopted the types of sexual harassment procedures and policies the students sought up to four years before trial.
18		See, e.g., State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980) (applying exception to short-term mental health commitment order); Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex.1972) (applying exception to juvenile delinquency adjudication with short sentence, because of stigma and legal effects attached to adjudication); Ex parte Ullmann, 616 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (applying exception to protective custody order, because of stigma and adverse consequences flowing from such order); Jones v. State, 602 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ) (applying exception to temporary involuntary commitment order, because of stigma of such order).
19		See Texas Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Benson, 893 S.W.2d 236, 240 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied); Woodruff v. Laredo, 686 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding under this theory that suit to declare city had no annexation authority over district not moot even though annexation ordinance passed while suit pending); Railroad Comm’n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 186 S.W.2d 117, 123-24 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1945, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (holding under this theory that suit to declare commission had no statutory authority to hold hearing under certain conditions not moot even though commission held hearing under these conditions while suit pending).