Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Phyllis LEE, Appellant

v.

GRAND PRAIRIE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee

NO. 03-25-00243-CV

|

Filed: November 13, 2025

FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, NO. D-1-GN-22-002034, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

Attorneys & Firms

Timothy White Jr., for Appellee.

Phyllis Lee, Pro Se.

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Theofanis

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

*1 Appellant Phyllis Lee, pro se, seeks to appeal from the district court’s judgment affirming the final decision of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the Division), asserting in four issues that (1) appellee is time-barred under section 409.021 of the labor code from disputing the compensability of her injury, (2) appellee failed to timely dispute the extent of Lee’s injury, (3) the trial court erred by dismissing Lee’s Motion for Judicial Review, and (4) appellee’s “post-deadline litigation conduct constitutes a violation of the appellant’s procedural due process rights under Texas Law.” Appellee Grand Prairie Independent School District (the District) has asserted in its brief that Lee’s waiver-of-compensability argument needed to have been addressed first by the Division of Workers’ Compensation, that other arguments raised by Lee are either not properly before this Court or are irrelevant, and that Lee’s appeal is untimely. Because we conclude that Lee’s notice of appeal was untimely and she has not satisfied the requirements for a restricted appeal, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Many of the facts underlying this appeal have been outlined in Lee v. Grand Prairie Independent School District, No. 03-23-00454-CV, 2024 WL 2965210 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.), in which we determined that Lee timely filed her petition for judicial review of the Division’s decision. After we remanded the cause for further proceedings, the trial court held a hearing in which Lee, proceeding pro se, and the District presented substantive arguments regarding the Division’s final decision. It is undisputed that on November 12, 2024, the trial court issued a final judgment affirming the Division’s final decision.¹ Lee timely filed a motion for new trial on December 5, 2024, which the trial court heard arguments on, then denied. Lee filed her notice of appeal on April 4, 2025.

The order from which Lee appeals was signed and entered by the district court on November 12, 2024. Lee’s motion for new trial extended the deadline for perfecting an appeal to February 10, 2025. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a) (“[T]he notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after the judgment is signed if any party timely files: (1) a motion for new trial ….”). Lee filed her notice of appeal with this Court on April 4, 2025, almost five months after the district court’s order was signed, and more than fifty days past the deadline. Lee’s notice of appeal was therefore untimely.

Although Lee’s notice of appeal was not filed within the applicable 90–day deadline, Rule 26.1 of the rules of appellate procedure allows for a restricted appeal when the appellant’s notice of appeal is filed within six months after the judgment or order appealed from is signed. See id. R. 26.1(c). Because Lee filed her notice of appeal within the six-month timeframe specified in Rule 26.1(c), we consider whether she has satisfied the requirements for a restricted appeal. Restricted appeals are governed by Rule 30 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides in relevant part:

*2 A party who did not participate—either in person or through counsel—in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did not timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time permitted by Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of appeal within the time permitted by Rule 26.1(c).

Id. A restricted appeal is available for the limited purpose of providing a non-participating party an opportunity to correct an erroneous judgment. Clopton v. Pak, 66 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). It does not allow a participating party who suffers an adverse judgment another opportunity to have the merits of his case reviewed. Id. A restricted appeal is available to Lee only if she: (1) filed a notice of appeal within six months of the district court’s judgment; (2) was a party to the underlying suit; (3) did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of; and (3) showed error apparent on the face of the record. See Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. 2004) (discussing requirements for restricted appeal under Rule 30).

Because Lee participated in the hearing that resulted in the trial court’s affirming the Division’s final order, and because she timely filed at least one postjudgment motion, she does not satisfy the requirements for a restricted appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 30; Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1996) (discussing what it means to “participate” within meaning of former Tex. R. App. P. 45). Having concluded that Lee’s notice of appeal was untimely and that she does not satisfy the requirements of a restricted appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address Lee’s complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 30; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (“[O]nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time under [former] Rule 41(a)(2) has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.”); Clopton, 66 S.W.3d at 515 (requirements for restricted appeal “are jurisdictional and will cut off a party’s right to seek relief … if they are not met”). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.