Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM, Appellant
v.
MELANIE SCHRINK, Appellee
No. 05-24-00036-CV
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Opinion Filed May 5, 2025
On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-04857
Before Justices Kennedy, Lewis, and Burns1
Opinion by Justice Lewis
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JESSICA LEWIS JUSTICE
*1 Reversed, Rendered, and Opinion Filed May 5, 2025
In the underlying proceeding, the University of Texas System (the UT System) sought judicial review of an administrative decision awarding workers’ compensation benefits to appellee Melanie Schrink. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment affirming the administrative benefits decision and awarding attorney’s fees to Schrink. On appeal, the UT System contends it has sovereign immunity from the fees claim and seeks reversal of the judgment with respect to the award of fees. Because we conclude the UT System has sovereign immunity from attorney’s fees here, we reverse the district court’s order denying the UT System’s plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Schrink’s attorney’s fees claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The UT System is a governmental unit that provides workers’ compensation coverage for the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UT Southwestern). Schrink worked at UT Southwestern between 2017 and 2021 as a physician assistant in orthopedic surgery. In May 2021, Schrink filed a work injury claim and sought workers’ compensation benefits through an administrative proceeding. The UT System challenged Schrink’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. After two administrative hearings, it was determined that Schrink was entitled to benefits. The UT System then sought judicial review of those administrative decisions.
In the district court, Schrink counterclaimed for attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Labor Code sections 408.221(c) (providing for fee shifting when a carrier seeks judicial review), 503.002(6) (applying various provisions of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) to the UT System), and 504.053(e) (applying various provisions of the Act to political subdivisions). Schrink also filed an “Application for Fee Approval Under Tex. Lab Code Sec. 408.221.” The UT System made a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity to the claim for attorney’s fees.
After a bench trial, the district court rendered a final judgment affirming the administrative determination that Schrink was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The district court also granted Schrink’s request for fees. The district court’s final judgment included findings of fact and conclusions of law. As to Schrink’s fees request, the district court concluded that “UT Systems is liable for payment of the attorney fees awarded in these cases pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 408.221(c) and as also authorized by Texas Labor Code §§ 503.002(6) and 504.053(e).” The district court further concluded that the UT System “does not have sovereign immunity from attorney fee-shifting under § 408.221(c) after S.B.2551 became effective.” The district court awarded Schrink $60,471.462 in “reasonable and necessary” attorney’s fees for “representation in the trial court” and contingent appellate fees of $36,000 for representation in the court of appeals, $30,000 for responding to petition for review in the supreme court, $24,000 for briefing in the supreme court, and $10,000 for oral argument in the supreme court. The UT System now appeals the district court’s award of attorney’s fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
*2 A party to a suit may challenge a trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the case by filing a plea to the jurisdiction. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Tex. 2007). A determination regarding whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In a plea, a party may properly assert that a suit is barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 225–26. On appeal, we review de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of the plea. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d at 156.
ANALYSIS
The UT System brings two issues on appeal. First, the UT System contends the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to Schrink because the UT System has sovereign immunity from such an award. Second, the UT System argues Schrink’s evidence of hours worked and tasks completed by her counsel was insufficient to prove the fees awarded were reasonable. Because our decision on the first issue is dispositive, we do not reach the sufficiency arguments asserted in UT System’s second issue.
I. The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
The Texas workers’ compensation statutes are in Title 5 of the Texas Labor Code. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 401.001–506.002. Title 5 is comprised of Subtitles A, B, and C. The Act is codified in Title 5, Subtitle A, Chapters 401 through 419 of the Texas Labor Code. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 401.001–419.007. Subtitle B consists of Chapter 451, which concerns the prohibition of discrimination and is irrelevant here. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 451.001–451.003. Subtitle C concerns workers’ compensation insurance coverage for certain government employees and consists of Chapters 501 through 506. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 501.001–506.002. Here, the district court awarded attorney’s fees to Schrink pursuant to sections 408.221(c), 503.002(6) and 504.053(e).
Chapter 408 of the Texas Labor Code concerns workers compensation benefits. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 408.001–408.222. Section 408.222(c) provides for fee shifting when an insurance carrier seeks judicial review of an administrative decision awarding workers’ compensation benefits to a claimant and the claimant prevails:
(c) An insurance carrier that seeks judicial review under Subchapter G, Chapter 410, of a final decision of the appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for, or the amount of, income or death benefits is liable for reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as provided by Subsection (d) incurred by the claimant as a result of the insurance carrier’s appeal if the claimant prevails on an issue on which judicial review is sought by the insurance carrier in accordance with the limitation of issues contained in Section 410.302. If the carrier appeals multiple issues and the claimant prevails on some, but not all, of the issues appealed, the court shall apportion and award fees to the claimant’s attorney only for the issues on which the claimant prevails. In making that apportionment, the court shall consider the factors prescribed by Subsection (d). This subsection does not apply to attorney’s fees for which an insurance carrier may be liable under Section 408.147. An award of attorney’s fees under this subsection is not subject to commissioner rules adopted under Subsection (f).
TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.221(c) (emphasis added).
Chapter 503 applies to employees of the University of Texas System and institutions of the University of Texas System. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 503.001–503.071. Section 503.002(6) sets out which provisions of the Act apply to Chapter 503:
*3 (a) The following provisions of Subtitle A apply to and are included in this chapter except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this chapter:
* * *
(6) Chapter 408, other than Sections 408.001(b) and (c);
* * *
(b) For the purpose of applying the provisions listed by Subsection (a) to this chapter, “employer” means “the institution,” and “system” means the insurance carrier under Section 503.022.3
(c) Neither this chapter nor Subtitle A authorizes a cause of action or damages against the system or any institution or employee of the system or institution beyond the actions and damages authorized by Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
TEX. LAB. CODE § 503.022 (emphasis added). Chapter 101 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA).
Chapter 504 applies to employees of political subdivisions of the state. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 504.001–503.074. Like Chapter 503, the legislature included nearly all of Chapter 408, including section 408.221, within Chapter 504, and limited liability under the chapter to the actions and damages authorized by the TTCA. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 504.002(a)(6), (c). Unlike Chapter 503, however, Chapter 504 includes a provision concerning waiver of a self-insuring political subdivision’s sovereign immunity:
(e) Nothing in this chapter waives sovereign immunity or creates a new cause of action, except that a political subdivision that self-insures either individually or collectively is liable for:
(1) sanctions, administrative penalties, and other remedies authorized under Chapter 415;
(2) attorney’s fees as provided by Section 408.221(c);and
(3) attorney’s fees as provided by Section 417.003.
TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.053(e). The reference to section 408.221(c), included in subsection (2), was added by the Texas legislature in 2019.4
II. Sovereign Immunity of the UT System
Sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the state unless the state consents and waives its immunity.” Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tex. 2018);see State v. Allodial Ltd. P’ship, 280 S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224). For the State to waive its sovereign immunity, the legislature must do so “ ‘by clear and unambiguous language.’ ” Nazari, 561 S.W.3d at 500 (quoting Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328–39 (Tex. 2006));Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Vitetta, No. 05-19-00105-CV, 2020 WL 5757393, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ellis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. 05-18-00521-CV, 2019 WL 1146711, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 13, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.));TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”).
*4 The UT System includes UT Southwestern and other specified institutions and entities. TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 65.02(a)(7), 74.101. The UT System is a governmental unit and “self-insured state institution.” Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Ochoa, 413 S.W.3d 769, 770 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied);Harry v. Univ. of Tex. Sys., 878 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ). “As a governmental unit, the UT System enjoys sovereign immunity unless it is waived by statute.” Univ. of Tex.-Pan Am. v. Miller, No. 03-10-00710-CV, 2013 WL 4818355, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 223, 224, and then citing Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999));see Lenoir v. U.T. Physicians, 491 S.W.3d 68, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]he UT System and its legislatively recognized additions are governmental units that may assert immunity”);Tex. S. Univ. v. Cape Conroe Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 626, 629 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to universities such as Texas Southern University).
Here, the district court denied the UT System’s plea to the jurisdiction and concluded the UT System was not entitled to sovereign immunity from Schrink’s request for attorney’s fees. We conclude that, in doing so, the trial court erred as a matter of law because no statute clearly and unambiguously waived the UT System’s sovereign immunity from fee shifting in its request for judicial review of Schrink’s workers’ compensation claims. See Ochoa 413 S.W.3d at 771 (holding that Ochoa’s claims for attorney’s fees against the UT System were barred by sovereign immunity).
A. TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.053(e) does not apply to a state agency such as the UT System.
In the district court, Schrink argued, and the district court concluded, that section 504.053(e)(2) was a statutory waiver of the UT System’s sovereign immunity from fee shifting in its request for judicial review of Shrink’s workers’ compensation claims. Chapter 504, however, does not apply to the UT System.
As noted above, Chapter 504 pertains to political subdivisions.5 TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 504.001–504.074. “Political subdivision” is defined as “a county, municipality, special district, school district, junior college district, housing authority, community center established under Subchapter A, Chapter 534, Health and Safety Code, or any other legally constituted political subdivision of the state.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.001(3). Sections 504.053(a) and 504.053(e) reference only political subdivisions:
(a) A political subdivision that self-insures either individually or collectively shall provide workers’ compensation medical benefits to the injured employees of the political subdivision through a workers’ compensation health care network certified under Chapter 1305, Insurance Code, if the governing body of the political subdivision determines that provision of those benefits through a network is available to the employees and practical for the political subdivision. A political subdivision may enter into interlocal agreements and other agreements with other political subdivisions to establish or contract with networks under this section.
* * *
(e) Nothing in this chapter waives sovereign immunity or creates a new cause of action, except that a political subdivision that self-insures either individually or collectively is liable for: …
TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.053(a), (e). Neither UT Southwestern nor the UT System are public subdivisions and, therefore, are not subject to Chapter 504.
*5 On the contrary, the UT System is a state agency. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 354, n. 5 (Tex. 2004) (indicating UT Southwestern was a state agency as part of the UT System);Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (1976) (describing Texas Tech University as a state agency);Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Crowder, 349 S.W.3d 640, 645–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (University of Texas Health Science Center is a state agency);Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Buford, 334 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.) (Texas Tech University Health Science Center is a state agency that is afforded sovereign immunity) (citing Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 298). A state agency is not a political subdivision of the state. E.g., Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643–44 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that statutory term “state agency” did not include political subdivisions);Crowder, 349 S.W.3d at 645–46 (as a state agency, the University of Texas Health Science Center is not a political subdivision). The UT System is, thus, excluded from Chapter 504 by the statute’s plain language. See Ellis, 2019 WL 1146711, at *3 (holding that the amendment to Chapter 451 of the labor code allowing “first responders” to seek relief under the chapter, and waiving sovereign or governmental immunity in such cases, did not waive immunity in cases in which the claimant is not a first responder, such as Ellis who was a bus driver).
Instead, the UT System’s liability under the Act is governed by Chapter 503,6 which, unlike Chapter 504, was not amended to include the reference to section 408.221 and does not otherwise include language establishing liability for attorney’s fees or waiving the UT System’s sovereign immunity from attorney’s fees sought in judicial review proceedings concerning workers’ compensation benefits. See generally TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 503.001–503.071. Further, Chapter 503 does not incorporate or reference Chapter 504 generally or section 504.053 specifically. Because Chapter 504 is inapplicable to a state agency such as the UT System, the district court erred by applying the Chapter 504 statutory waiver to the UT System here.
B. No statute clearly and unambiguously waives the UT System’s sovereign immunity from the Act’s fee shifting provision.
The district court’s error in applying Chapter 504 does not, however, end our inquiry because the district court also concluded that the award of fees against the UT System was authorized by sections 408.221(c) and 503.002(6) of the labor code. This too was erroneous.
As set forth above, section 408.221(c) of the Act provides that an insurance carrier that seeks judicial review of a final decision of the appeals panel in a workers’ compensation action “is liable for reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees … incurred by the claimant as a result of the insurance carrier’s appeal if the claimant prevails on an issue on which judicial review is sought by the insurance carrier[.]” TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.221(c). Chapter 503, which applies to the UT System, affirmatively includes section 408.221. TEX. LAB. CODE § 503.002(a)(6). However, any liability for fees is limited by the TTCA:
(c) Neither this chapter nor Subtitle A authorizes a cause of action or damages against the system or any institution or employee of the system or institution beyond the actions and damages authorized by Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
TEX. LAB. CODE § 503.002(c).
The TTCA does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees. State Off. of Risk Mgmt. v. Davis, 315 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied);see also Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 448 (Tex. 1994) (Gonzalez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “the Texas Tort Claims Act does not expressly provide for the recovery of fees and costs”). Because section 503.002(c) limits the UT System’s liability under the labor code to only those actions and damages authorized by the TTCA, and the TTCA does not provide for the recovery of fees, we conclude the legislature has not expressly waived the UT System’s sovereign immunity for attorney’s fees under the labor code. See Ochoa, 413 S.W.3d at 773–74 (analyzing Chapter 503 and holding that sovereign immunity barred a workers’ compensation claim for attorney’s fees against the UT System);see also Davis, 315 S.W.3d at 154 (analyzing substantively identical language in section 501.002(d)7 and holding that the legislature had not expressly waived state agencies’ sovereign immunity for attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases).
*6 We find our sister court’s opinion in Ochoa instructive, as the underlying facts of Ochoa mirror those at issue here. In Ochoa, the UT System sought judicial review of an administrative decision concluding Gloria Ochoa was disabled due to a workplace injury and was entitled to disability benefits. 413 S.W.3d at 770. In the trial court, Ochoa filed a counterclaim and a motion for attorney’s fees. Id. The UT System filed a plea to the jurisdiction in response and argued Ochoa’s attorney’s fees claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. The trial court denied the plea, and the UT System appealed. Id. at 770–71.
On appeal, the UT System argued that section 408.221(c) of the labor code did not waive its sovereign immunity from attorney’s fees claims because section 503.002(c) limits recoverable causes of action and damages to actions and damages authorized by the TTCA. Ochoa, 413 S.W.3d at 771–72. Because the TTCA did not authorize an award of fees, awarding fees to Ochoa would conflict with Chapter 503 by authorizing a cause of action beyond those authorized by the TTCA. Id. at 772. The Austin Court of Appeals agreed and held that sovereign immunity barred a workers’ compensation claim for attorney’s fees against the UT System. Id. at 773–74. “[T]he inclusion of Chapter 408—the chapter containing the attorney-fee provision—in the [governing labor code provisions] is not sufficient by itself to waive governmental immunity.” Id. at 773 (quoting Manbeck v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 381 S.W.3d 528, 531 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam)). The Ochoa court also concluded that UT System’s decision to seek judicial review of the workers’ compensation determination did not waive its sovereign immunity from a claim for attorney’s fees. Id. at 774. Applying the same analysis here, we conclude the UT System remains immune from Schrink’s claim for attorney’s fees.
Prior to the Austin Court of Appeals issuing Ochoa, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that political subdivisions retained their governmental immunity from claims for attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases. Manbeck, 381 S.W.3d at 530–33. Manbeck involved a school district’s governmental immunity under Chapter 504 of the labor code. Id. at 530. In Manbeck, the Texas Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the inclusion of Chapter 408 in the list of provisions adopted by Chapter 504 amounted to a waiver of governmental immunity from such fees as to political subdivisions. Id. at 531. The Manbeck court held that “the inclusion of Chapter 408—the chapter containing the attorney fee provision—in the Political Subdivisions Law’s list of adopted provisions is not sufficient by itself to waive governmental immunity.” Id. at 531. The court further concluded that AISD did not lose its governmental immunity from Manbeck’s claim for fees by seeking judicial review of the administrative award of benefits. Id. at 533.
The Ochoa court extended the Manbeck rationale to the sovereign immunity of the UT System under Chapter 503. Ochoa, 413 S.W.3d at 773–74. In the district court, Schrink argued that Manbeck and Ochoa were no longer good law because S.B. 2551 overruled Manbeck. We disagree. Although Manbeck was decided before the 2019 amendments to Chapter 504, those amendments were to section 504.053, not to section 504.002, the provision analyzed by the supreme court in Manbeck. The amendments to Chapter 504, therefore, did not overrule Manbeck‘s conclusion that the inclusion of Chapter 408 in Chapter 504 was not a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. That conclusion remains applicable to the issue at bar because the language in section 504.002(c) analyzed by the Manbeck court is in substantially the same form as the language in section 503.002(c) analyzed by the Ochoa court and applicable to the UT System here. Compare TEX. LAB. CODE § 504.002(c) with TEX. LAB. CODE § 503.002(c). Both provisions limit the applicability of section 408.221(c) to causes of action and damages authorized by the TTCA.
*7 Because the TTCA does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees, and nothing in Chapter 408 or Chapter 503 expressly waives the UT System’s sovereign immunity from an award of fees, the UT System, as a state agency, retains its sovereign immunity from Schrink’s claim for attorney’s fees in this workers’ compensation case. See Ochoa, 413 S.W.3d at 773–74;see also Manbeck, 381 S.W.3d at 533;Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Thomas, 464 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (applying Manbeck and Ochoa and holding that the UT System retained its sovereign immunity from the claim for attorney’s fees in a workers’ compensation case);City of Dallas v. Thompson, No. 12-19-00032-CV, 2019 WL 2710247, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying Manbeck and holding that section 408.221(c) did not waive the City of Dallas’s governmental immunity from Thompson’s claim for attorney’s fees). Because the UT System is immune from such a claim, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Schrink’s claim for attorney’s fees. See Davis, 315 S.W.3d at 153 (noting that sovereign immunity from suit defeats trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction). We therefore sustain the UT System’s first issue.
CONCLUSION
The UT System has sovereign immunity from Schrink’s claim for attorney’s fees in this workers’ compensation case and did not lose that immunity by seeking judicial review of the administrative findings affirming Schrink’s benefits claim. Accordingly, we sustain the UT System’s first issue, reverse the district court’s order denying the UT System’s plea to the jurisdiction, and render judgment dismissing Schrink’s attorney’s fees claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT
Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis. Justices Kennedy and Burns8 participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the portions of the trial court’s Final Judgment denying the University of Texas System’s plea to the jurisdiction and awarding Melanie Schrink attorney’s fees are REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED dismissing Melanie Schrink’s claims for attorney’s fees for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
It is ORDERED that appellant THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM recover its costs of this appeal from appellee MELANIE SCHRINK.
Judgment entered this 5th day of May, 2025.
Footnotes |
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| 1 | The Hon. Robert Burns, Retired Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas, sitting by assignment. |
| 2 | The district court awarded Schrink’s counsel Kay Goggin attorney’s fees of $50,413.10 through trial and counsel Peter Rogers attorney’s fees of $10,058.36 through trial. |
| 3 | Section 503.022 is titled “Authority to Self-Insure” and simply states that “[a]n institution may self-insure as part of a system insurance plan.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 503.022. |
| 4 | In 2019, the Texas legislature passed S.B. 2551, titled “Liability, Payment, and Benefits for Certain Workers’ Compensation Claims,” which amended various sections of the government code and labor code and was related to workers’ compensation claims for cancer by firefighters employed by political subdivisions. See generally Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 701, § 6, 2019 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. Ch. 701 (eff. June 10, 2019) (S.B. 2551). S.B. 2511 amended Texas Labor Code section 504.053(e) by adding subsections (1) and (2). |
| 5 | Chapter 504 is titled “Workers’ Compensation Insurance Coverage for Employees of Political Subdivisions.” |
| 6 | Chapter 503 is titled “Workers’ Compensation Insurance Coverage for Employees of the University of Texas System and Employees of Institutions of the University of Texas System.” |
| 7 | Compare section 503.002(c) (“Neither this chapter nor Subtitle A authorizes a cause of action or damages against the system or any institution or employee of the system or institution beyond the actions and damages authorized by Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code), with section 501.002(d) (“Neither this chapter nor Subtitle A authorizes a cause of action or damages against the state, a state agency, or an employee of the state beyond the actions and damages authorized by Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”). |
| 8 | The Hon. Robert Burns, Retired Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas, sitting by assignment. |