Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

ANITA SHARMAN, Appellant

v.

AMERICAN ZURICH, Appellee

No. 05-24-01394-CV

|

Opinion Filed March 25, 2026

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-06892

Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee

Opinion by Justice Barbare

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CYNTHIA BARBARE JUSTICE

*1 Anita Sharman (Sharman) appeals the directed verdict granted in favor of American Zurich (American). In her first two issues, Sharman argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her “critical” evidence and admitting American’s improper hearsay evidence. In a third issue, she challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. We affirm.

Background

Fry’s Electronics, Inc. (Fry’s) employed Sharman as a certified computer technician. On April 1, 2020, she allegedly slipped and hit her lower left leg on a metal object while closing the store. Furthermore, Sharman did not report the incident that day, nor did she report any injury in the days that followed.

On April 8, 2020, Sharman was called to her manager’s office and informed that she was being furloughed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. She refused to sign a letter confirming the furlough. The next day, Sharman filed a worker’s compensation claim with the Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) and asserted that she was entitled to receive benefits under American’s worker’s compensation policy. She reported that she was injured on April 1 and that the cause of injury was “debris and heavy equipment in the way leading to slippage and injury.”

On February 1, 2021, an administrative law judge determined that “the preponderance of the evidence does not support her account of having been injured at work,” and Sharman “did not sustain a compensable injury on April 1, 2020.” In its decision, the administrative law judge noted that video surveillance footage of the area where she was working on April 1 showed her “walking into and out of the area covered by the video without any evidence of having been injured.” Additionally, other coworkers provided statements that Sharman never mentioned hurting herself on April 1, and her general manager denied that she told him about the injury prior to the furlough meeting.

Sharman appealed to the DWC Appeals Panel, which affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision finding no compensable injury. Sharman then filed her original petition in district court to set aside the DWC’s decision.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. After voir dire, the trial court considered the parties’ objections to certain evidence. It excluded several of Sharman’s exhibits, which included alleged medical records, and overruled her objections to American’s exhibits. Sharman then stated that she was not testifying nor calling any witnesses. The trial court confirmed that, “you wish to stand on the exhibits that you entered into evidence; is that right?” She answered affirmatively. American moved for a directed verdict because “[t]here is no evidence to indicate that an injury occurred.” The trial court granted the directed verdict, and this appeal followed.

Jurisdiction

We first address American’s argument that we lack appellate jurisdiction because Sharman did not timely file a notice of appeal.

Sharman prematurely filed a motion for reconsideration and rehearing in the trial court on August 26, 2024. The trial court signed a final judgment on September 16, 2024, and Sharman filed her notice of appeal on November 27, 2024.

*2 Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a) provides that an appeal must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed unless a party timely files a post-judgment motion, which extends the deadline to ninety days after the judgment is signed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). A premature post-judgment motion is effective to extend the appellate deadlines. See TEX. R. APP. P. 329b(a); see also In Interest of D.V.D., No. 05-17-00268-CV, 2018 WL 2316014, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ryland Enter., Inc. v. Weatherspoon, 355 S.W.3d 664, 665 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (“This Court has consistently treated minor procedural mishaps with leniency, preserving the right to appeal.”)).

Sharman’s prematurely-filed motion for reconsideration and rehearing extended her deadline to file a notice of appeal to ninety days after the final judgment was signed on September 16, 2024. Therefore, her notice of appeal was due by December 16, 2024.¹ Because Sharman filed the notice of appeal on November 27, 2024, we conclude that we have jurisdiction.

Pro Se Litigants

Sharman appeared pro se in the trial court and now on appeal. In Texas, an individual who is a party to civil litigation has the right to represent herself at trial and on appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 7. The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to adhere to our rules of evidence and procedure. Ofuani v. Ofuani, No. 05-24-00861-CV, 2025 WL 2368876, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). This includes error preservation rules. Interest of S.L., No. 05-21-00874-CV, 2022 WL 896874, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Courts regularly caution pro se litigants that they will not be treated differently than a party who is represented by a licensed attorney. Ofuani, 2025 WL 2368876, at *2. To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Interest of S.L., 2022 WL 896874, at *2. With these parameters in mind, we now consider Sharman’s issues.

Exclusion of Evidence

In her first issue, Sharman argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding three of her exhibits: Exhibit 1 (alleged medical records from Dr. Gary Goff); Exhibit 2 (a Texas Workers’ Compensation Work Status Report); and Exhibit 3 (a medical article printed from MDHealth.com). American responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the exhibits because Sharman failed to authenticate them and, alternatively, she suffered no harm from their exclusion.

We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. ABC Supply Co., No. 05-16-00157-CV, 2017 WL 1536502, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Estate of Miller, 243 S.W.3d 831, 836–37 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)). But we do not reach the question of whether evidence was erroneously excluded unless the complaint has been preserved for review. Id. To challenge the exclusion of evidence by the trial court on appeal, the complaining party must present the excluded evidence to the trial court by offer of proof or bill of exception. Id. The offer of proof allows a trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the actual evidence. Estate of Miller, 243 S.W.3d at 837. When there is no offer of proof made before the trial court, the party must introduce the excluded testimony into the record by a formal bill of exception. Id.

*3 At the beginning of trial, the court asked Sharman to identify the exhibits to which American had not objected. She stated that to the best of her knowledge, “the Defendant has not objected to any of my exhibits submitted.” American clarified that it was objecting to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, which were “medical records.” American argued that they were “not in admissible form. There’s no certificate of authenticity, there’s no business record affidavit.” Sharman responded that medical records “are an exception to business record affidavits as per Texas law.” The trial court sustained American’s objections and excluded the three exhibits.

Sharman has not cited to any offer of proof, either informally or formally, in the record, and our review has revealed none. However, despite the trial court sustaining the objections, the court reporter included the exhibits in the record. One purpose of the offer of proof or bill of review is to enable an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion of evidence was erroneous or harmful. See In re Canales, 113 S.W.3d 56, 68 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). Since we have the omitted exhibits in the record, we will consider the trial court’s ruling.

We need not determine whether the three exhibits complied with rules of evidence 803(4) and 803(6) because any error in their exclusion was harmless. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(4) (describing hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment); Id. 803(6) (describing hearsay exception for “records of a regularly conducted activity”). To be entitled to reversal due to the erroneous exclusion of evidence, an appellant must show that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); State v. Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009). The Texas Supreme Court has recognized “the impossibility of prescribing a specific test to determine whether a particular error is harmful, and entrust[s] that determination to the sound discretion of the reviewing court.” Id. In making this determination, we must review the entire record. Id.

Exhibit 1 appears to be the copy of a progress note from Dr. Gary Goff, dated April 27, 2020, and printed from an online patient portal. It indicates Sharman received treatment for (1) cellulitis of left lower extremity; (2) stress fracture of the left tibia; and (3) pain in the left tibia. Exhibit 2 is a Texas Workers’ Compensation Work Status Report noting that Dr. Rabia Kahn evaluated Sharman on April 11, 2020, for “left leg pain and shoulder pain (right shoulder) since 04/01/2020; pt fell.” Exhibit 3 is an article titled, “Non-Displaced Bone Fracture: What It Is and How to Treat It,” which appears to be printed from an internet site called MDhealth.com.

Sharman argues that Exhibits 1 and 2 were “relevant to diagnosing and treating the injury which were essential to [her] proving that an injury did occur.” The Labor Code defines “compensable injury” as “an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment.” TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 401.011(10); State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tex. 2017). “Injury” means “damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm.” TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 401.011(26).

Generally, expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors. See Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007). However, lay testimony is “adequate to prove causation in those cases in which general experience and common sense will enable a layman to determine, with reasonable probability, the causal relationship between an event and the condition.” Id. Thus, “lay testimony establishing a sequence of events [that] provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event and the condition is sufficient proof of causation.” Id.

*4 Exhibits 1 and 2, while indicating that Sharman suffered some injuries, do not demonstrate how any alleged “injury” that occurred on April 1, 2020, resulted in subsequent diagnoses three weeks later of cellulitis and a stress fracture in her left tibia from an “injury that [arose] out of and in the course and scope of employment.” TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 401.011(10) (defining “compensable injury”). Exhibit 3 broadly discusses non-displaced fractures and how to treat them, but nothing within Exhibits 1 and 2 indicates Sharman suffered a non-displaced fracture.

Even considering the excluded exhibits, Sharman failed to present expert testimony explaining the causal link between her alleged on-the-job accident and her injuries described in the medical records because they were outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors. See Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 665. A layperson is unlikely to be familiar with cellulitis or how hitting her leg on a metal object could possibly lead to the medical condition. While a lay person might be able to explain to the jury a broken tibia, Sharman informed the trial court she was not testifying, meaning she was not prepared to present even lay testimony regarding her injuries.

American presented evidence from Fry’s Worker’s Compensation Administrator that he had reviewed surveillance video footage from the relevant time period of Sharman’s injury. Although Fry’s did not have video from inside the cage area where she said the injury occurred, he “observed claimant walking fine showing no signs that she had been injured after walking out of the cage.” American also presented evidence of a co-worker who was the “closing keyholder” on April 1. During his closing duties, he talked to Sharman, and “she never mentioned” to him anything about “any incident or accident.”

Considering the excluded documents and the record as a whole, Sharman failed to establish a “compensable injury,” an essential element of her claim. See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 401.011(10), 401.011(26). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s ruling likely caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Sharman’s first issue is overruled.

Admission of Evidence

In her second issue, Sharman argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting American’s Exhibit 2 (exhibits to a videotaped deposition, which was not admitted into evidence) and Exhibit 3 (the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation decision in her case).

Sharman objected at trial to Exhibit 2 because “Defense did not provide me with a copy of the video that he is presenting as deposition.” On appeal, she argues that Exhibit 2 contains numerous unauthenticated hearsay statements and claims that American misled the trial court by misrepresenting facts “which only served to be prejudicial to [her] case.”

Sharman objected at trial to Exhibit 3 because the DWC judgment referenced several exhibits, and “[t]he additional documentation relied on for the judgment is mentioned but not included in the exhibit.” On appeal, she argues that the judgment incorrectly states the wrong venue and makes “erroneous and misleading hearsay statements” about her injury. None of the “misleading” statements were argued in the trial court but instead “elaborate[d] upon” in her brief. To preserve an issue on appeal, the objection raised in the trial court must comport with the issue raised on appeal. DGF Holdings, Ltd. v. Air Clinic Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., No. 05-23-01262-CV, 2025 WL 1558886, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 2, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

*5 Because Sharman’s arguments on appeal do not comport with her trial objections, no error is preserved. See Indep. Bank v. Ganter, No. 05-21-00375-CV, 2022 WL 17986042, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule Sharman’s second issue.

Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her final issue, Sharman argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. American responds that she did not preserve her issue in the trial court and has not properly briefed the issue on appeal.

The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to adhere to our appellate rules of procedure. Ofuani, 2025 WL 2368876, at *2. Under the “ISSUES PRESENTED,” Sharman states, “Is there factually sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court?” Her brief contains no other mention of factual insufficiency.² The rules of appellate procedure require the appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h). An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for the court to review. Allen v. PR Genesis Katy LP, No. 05-22-01088-CV, 2023 WL 5740180, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Birnbaum v. Law Offices of G. David Westfall, 120 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

In her reply brief, Sharman attempted to address some of the briefing deficiencies noted by American in its appellee brief, and she also raised new issues and arguments.³ However, the rules of appellate procedure do not permit this approach. An appellant’s reply brief is limited to responding to the appellee’s issues, arguments, and authorities. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.3 (stating an appellant “may file a reply brief addressing any matter in the appellee’s brief”); Williams v. Ecom/Willmax Bellagio, L.P., No. 05-22-00098-CV, 2024 WL 2150059, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Dallas Cnty. v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 104 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). An appellant’s newly-raised issue asserted for the first time in a reply brief is deemed waived and not properly before the reviewing court for determination. Williams, 2024 WL 2150059, at *2; Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d at 104.

In the interest of justice, however, we consider whether the trial court properly granted a directed verdict. We review a trial court’s grant of a directed verdict de novo, using the legal sufficiency standard that appellate courts apply to no-evidence summary judgments. City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tex. 2022). A trial court properly grants a directed verdict when no evidence supports a vital fact. Id. We consider the evidence in the light favorable to the party suffering an adverse judgment, crediting all reasonable inferences and disregarding evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id.

*6 American moved for a directed verdict after Sharman failed to put on any evidence, supported by expert or lay testimony, of a compensable injury. See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 401.011(10), 401.011(26). Because there was no evidence of a vital element of her claim, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict. Sharman’s final issue is overruled.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Footnotes
1	Ninety days from the date of judgment fell on a Sunday; therefore, the due date was Monday. TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1.
2	On April 8, 2025, the Court sent Sharman a letter explaining that her brief did not comply with the rules of appellate procedure and provided her the opportunity to file an amended brief. Sharman’s amended brief did not address the deficiencies related to her factual sufficiency issue.
3	She argues that she did not “need to specifically challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence when appealing a directed verdict” because “the standard of review for a directed verdict is essentially a legal sufficiency review.” She then intertwines arguments for why the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.