Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

MEDICAL ARTS HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a Medical Arts Hospital, Appellant

v.

TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY and Marita S. Henson a/k/a Marita Henson, Appellees

No. 05-95-00402-CV.

|

Feb. 23, 1996.

Before Justices MORRIS, WHITTINGTON, and JAMES.

OPINION

WHITTINGTON, Justice.

*1 Medical Arts Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Medical Arts Hospital (“Medical Arts”) appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Transportation Insurance Company (“TIC”) and Marita S. Henson a/k/a Marita Henson (“Henson”). In eight points of error, Medical Arts complains generally that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment because: (1) the trial court had original, or alternatively, appellate jurisdiction over the cause; (2) Medical Arts should have been given the opportunity to cure pleading defects; (3) TIC did not establish it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (4) Medical Arts had taken a nonsuit on its claims against Henson prior to the hearing on her motion for summary judgment. In its sole crosspoint of error, TIC contends the trial judge erred in not granting TIC’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse and remand it in part.

BACKGROUND

On July 29, 1990, Henson was injured while at work. As a result of her injury, Henson was hospitalized for ten days at Medical Arts. TIC was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Henson’s employer. Henson filed a workers’ compensation claim, and the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”) ruled on her claim on February 3, 1993.¹ Henson appealed the Commission’s ruling to the district court. During the appeal, Henson and TIC entered into an agreed judgment. Under the agreed judgment, TIC agreed to pay all reasonable and necessary expenses of Henson’s past medical treatment for injuries resulting from her on-the-job injury.

On July 14, 1994, Medical Arts filed a claim for $23,946.50 with the Commission for services rendered during Henson’s hospitalization. In a letter dated July 29, 1994, the Commission stated it did not have jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed the request. On August 18, 1994, the Commission received written notification of Medical Arts’s dissatisfaction with the Commission’s decision. In the notification, Medical Arts asked the Commission to set aside its previous ruling and take jurisdiction of the claim. The following day, the Commission informed Medical Arts (1) the Commission did not have any authority to act on Medical Arts’s claim, (2) its decision was final, and (3) Medical Arts could file suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.

On September 2, 1994, Medical Arts sued TIC and Henson in district court, alleging that (1) TIC and Henson were liable for the hospital bill, and (2) it had properly fulfilled all conditions precedent to filing suit. TIC and Henson each filed motions for summary judgment. In her motion, Henson claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cause because Medical Arts had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. In its motion, TIC incorporated the arguments and evidence in Henson’s summary judgment motion and further alleged that Medical Arts’s claims were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.²

*2 On November 11, 1994, Medical Arts took a nonsuit on its claims against Henson. TIC then filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. On December 9, 1994, the trial judge held a hearing on Henson’s motion for summary judgment and granted Henson’s motion without stating the legal basis for his ruling. Five days later, the trial judge held a hearing on TIC’s motion and granted a final summary judgment. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court applies the following standards:

(1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(2) In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists precluding summary judgment, we take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true.

(3) We indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor.

Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). For a defendant as movant to prevail on summary judgment, it must either (1) disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff’s theories of recovery or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff’s cause of action. International Union UAW Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A matter is conclusively established if ordinary minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982).

Summary judgment is designed to eliminate unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses; it is not intended to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing on the merits of any real fact issue. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). When an order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it rests, the judgment will be affirmed if any of the grounds raised in the motion for summary judgment are meritorious. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 698 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ dism’d by agr.).

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

In its second point of error, Medical Arts contends the trial judge erred in granting TIC and Henson summary judgment because Medical Arts had (1) exhausted its administrative remedies and (2) timely perfected its appeal to the district court. We agree.

Article 8307, section 5 of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

[a]ny interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision of [the Commission] shall, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of said final ruling and decision by [the Commission], file with [the Commission] notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision. And he shall within twenty (20) days after giving such notice bring suit in the county where the injury occurred to set aside said final ruling and decision….

*3 Act of May 23, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 412, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1113, 1113, (repealed 1989). This section requires a party to exhaust its administrative remedies at the agency level before seeking relief in the district court; failure to do so will prevent the party from later invoking the jurisdiction of the district court. Ankrom v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 900 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).

The summary judgment record shows Medical Arts’s claims were submitted to the Commission and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on July 29, 1994. On August 18, 1994, Medical Arts notified the Commission in writing of its dissatisfaction with the decision. The following day, the Commission informed Medical Arts that its decision was final and that Medical Arts could “file suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.” On September 2, 1994, Medical Arts sued TIC and Henson in district court. Because the summary judgment record shows Medical Arts (1) notified the Commission it would not “abide by said final ruling and decision” within twenty days of the decision, and (2) brought suit within twenty days after giving notice of its dissatisfaction, we hold that the summary judgment record establishes (1) Medical Arts exhausted its administrative remedies and (2) invoked the district court’s appellate jurisdiction.

In reaching our decision, we necessarily reject TIC’s argument that Medical Arts did not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction because its original petition failed to mention the Commission’s July 29 ruling or specifically state it was appealing the Commission’s decision. Although Medical Arts’s original petition did not expressly state it was appealing the Commission’s decision, the petition did state “[a]ll conditions precedent to the liability of both [d]efendants to [p]laintiff under any cause of action pleaded herein have occurred or been performed or have been excused or waived.” As a general rule, a court presumes jurisdiction over a case unless it is clear from the pleadings that the court lacks jurisdiction. See Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989) (courts should liberally construe pleadings and presume jurisdiction unless lack of jurisdiction shows on face of petition); Smith v. Texas Improvement Co., 570 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) (court must presume jurisdiction unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on face of petition). Here, there is nothing in the petition which suggests the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Moreover, neither TIC nor Henson specifically denied Medical Arts’s allegation that all conditions precedent had occurred. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 54. We note additionally that, prior to the summary judgment hearings, Medical Arts amended its petition to include a statement that it was appealing “from a final award or decision of the Texas Workers Compensation Commission … signed on July 29, 1994.” See Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804. We hold the trial judge erred in concluding that (1) Medical Arts failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit in district court, and (2) the trial court had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. We sustain Medical Arts’s second point of error.

*4 Due to our disposition of the second point of error, we need not address appellant’s first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth points of error and appellee’s sole crosspoint of error. See Tex.R.App. P. 90(a).

NONSUIT

In its seventh point of error, Medical Arts contends the trial judge erred in granting Henson summary judgment because Medical Arts took a nonsuit on its claims against Henson prior to the hearing on her summary judgment motion. We agree.

A plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of its evidence other than rebuttal evidence. Tex.R. Civ. P. 162; BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex.1990). Once the plaintiff abandons by nonsuit a claim against a defendant, the trial court loses subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. Williams v. National Mortgage Co., 903 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied). The plaintiff’s right to take a nonsuit is unqualified and absolute provided the defendant has not made a claim for affirmative relief. General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1990); see Tex.R. Civ. P. 162. If the defendant has made a claim for affirmative relief, the nonsuit affects only those claims originally raised by the plaintiff and does not prejudice the defendant’s right to be heard on its pending claims for sanctions, attorney’s fees, or other costs pending at the time of nonsuit. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 162; see also Page v. Page, 780 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).

Medical Arts filed suit against Henson for breach of contract, sworn account, and attorney’s fees. In her original answer, Henson denied Medical Arts’s allegations and asserted a claim for rule 13 sanctions. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 13. Henson then moved for summary judgment. On November 11, 1994, Medical Arts took a nonsuit on its claims against Henson. After a hearing twenty-eight days later, the trial judge granted Henson’s motion for summary judgment on Medical Arts’s causes of action and denied Henson’s request for sanctions. Because Medical Arts took its nonsuit before the trial judge ruled on her motion, Henson was not entitled to summary judgment on any of Medical Arts’s claims. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 162. Nevertheless, Henson was entitled to be heard on her pending claim for sanctions. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 162; Page, 780 S.W.2d at 2. Accordingly, we sustain Medical Arts’s seventh point of error to the extent it complains of the trial court’s decision to grant Henson relief on Medical Arts’s claims. We overrule point of error seven to the extent it complains of the trial judge’s ruling on Henson’s motion for sanctions.

We affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment denying Henson’s motion for sanctions. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment granting Henson summary judgment on Medical Arts’s causes of action and that portion of the trial court’s judgment granting TIC’s motion for summary judgment and remand those portions of the cause to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

	Footnotes
1		We apply the version of the workers’ compensation act in effect at the time of the employee’s injury to determine the rights and duties of the parties. See Harris v. Varo, Inc., 814 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ). Although the Industrial Accident Board was the governing body at the time of Henson’s injury, the Board was renamed the Workers’ Compensation Commission in subsequent legislation. See Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg., R.S., ch. 103, part II, § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 269, 281-82, repealed by Act of December 12, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(10), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 115 (current version at Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 402.001 (Vernon Pamph.1995)). For purposes of this discussion, we will refer to the governing body as the Commission.
2		The basis for TIC’s affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel is Medical Arts’s alleged failure to timely appeal the Commission’s decision. Under article 8307, section 5 of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, if a party fails to timely appeal a decision by the Commission, the ruling then becomes final and “shall be binding upon all parties thereto.” See Act of May 23, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 412, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1113, 1113, repealed by Act of December 12, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, art. 16, § 16.01(10), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 114 (current version at Tex. Lab.Code Ann. §§ 410.251-.254 (Vernon Pamph.1995)). TIC contends that because Medical Arts did not timely appeal the Commission’s ruling, the Commission’s ruling was final and, therefore, barred Medical Arts’s suit in district court.