Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Keith Dewayne OTEN, Appellant,

v.

GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Appellee.

No. 05-96-01869-CV.

|

Dec. 10, 1998.

Before THOMAS, C.J., WHITTINGTON and ROACH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROACH.

*1 Keith Wayne Oten appeals a summary judgment rendered against him on his claim that appellee Greyhound Lines, Inc. discriminated against him because he filed a workers’ compensation claim. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996). In three points of error, Oten generally complains the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there are fact issues on (1) the causal connection between Oten’s workers’ compensation claim and Greyhound’s termination of his employment and (2) whether Oten suffered compensable mental anguish.

After reviewing all points of error, we conclude that all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law. Therefore, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1. The factual nature of the case as well as its procedural history, pleadings and the summary judgment evidence are well known to the parties; therefore, we do not recount in detail these matters.

In its motion for summary judgment, Greyhound contended that Oten was terminated from his employment due to his repeated failure to disclose previous injuries to Greyhound. Greyhound concludes that because it established a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating appellant’s employment, the burden shifted to Oten to establish a causal connection between the filing of the workers’ compensation claim and the termination of his employment. Greyhound asserts that Oten failed to meet this burden and summary judgment was therefore proper.

In Oten’s response to the motion for summary judgment, Oten sought to establish the existence of a fact issue on causation. Among other summary judgment evidence, Oten presented the affidavit of Kenji Hutchinson, who testified that he was the night manager for Greyhound during the relevant time. Hutchinson stated that Greyhound’s terminal manager, Neil Isreb, told him that, “Mr. Oten was not really injured and that he had been on workers’ compensation two or three times before and he was doing so again.” It is undisputed that Neil Isreb is the Greyhound representative who terminated Oten’s employment. We conclude this summary judgment evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue on whether Greyhound terminated Oten’s employment because he filed a workers’ compensation claim. See Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450-51 & n. 3 (Tex.1996). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We sustain the first and second points of error to the extent they complain about the existence of a fact issue regarding the causal connection between Oten’s termination and the filing of the workers’ compensation claim. Because of our disposition of these points, we need not consider Oten’s third point of error. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.