Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant,

v.

Nelda R. FOLEY, Appellee.

No. 05-97-00497-CV.

|

June 15, 1999.

Before KINKEADE, MALONEY, and O’NEILL, JJ.

OPINION

MALONEY.

*1 Dallas Independent School District (DISD) sought judicial review of the Workers’ Compensation Commission appeals panel decision that Nelda Foley timely reported her injury and sustained disability. The trial court directed verdict for Foley. In a single point of error, DISD argues the trial court erred in granting Foley’s motion for directed verdict because she did not properly notify DISD of her injury. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

DISD employed Foley as a fifth grade teacher. On August 8, 1994, Foley injured her back while lifting a box at work. Foley filed a workers’ compensation claim. DISD contested Foley’s claim and the hearing officer found she had not given timely notice of her injury to her employer. The appeals panel reversed the hearing officer’s decision.

A jury heard DISD’s case in chief challenging the appeals panel’s decision. At the close of DISD’s evidence, the trial court granted Foley’s motion for a directed verdict.

NOTICE

In a single point of error, DISD argues the trial court erred in granting Foley’s motion for directed verdict. Specifically, DISD contends no evidence or insufficient evidence exists to show the she gave DISD timely notice of her injury because she did not report her injury to her principal within thirty days.

1. Standard of Review

The trial court performs a modified de novo review of a Workers’ Compensation Commission appeals panel decision. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Manasco, 971 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex.1998); Texas Workers’ Compensation Com’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 530-31 (Tex.1995). The Workers’ Compensation Act provides that the factfinder is informed of the workers’ compensation commission decision, but independently decides the issues by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (Vernon 1996); Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 531.

When reviewing the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the trial court directed verdict and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Szczepanik v. First Southern Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994).

2. Applicable Law

An employee must notify her employer of a work-related injury no later than thirty days after the date on which the injury occurs. The injured employee may give notice to (1) the employer or (2) an employee of the employer who holds a supervisory or management position. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.001 (Vernon 1996). Not giving notice as required by section 409.001 relieves the employer and its insurance carrier of workers’ compensation liability. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.002 (Vernon 1996).

We construe statutes as written and, if possible, determine the legislature’s intent from the statutory language. Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985). If a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we find the legislative intent in the plain and common meaning of the words used. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993).

3. Application of Law to the Facts

*2 Foley testified that a box fell on her at work and injured her on August 8, 1994. Sometime in mid-August Rosemary Solomon had telephoned her. During the conversation, she told Solomon about her injury. Solomon and Foley had been friends since college. Solomon was a supervisor in DISD’s Food and Child Nutrition Department. But, Foley’s school was not one of the schools Solomon supervised. Foley did not telephone the principal’s office until September 26. She talked to the principal’s secretary and told her of her injury. Foley first talked to the principal about her injury on September 29.

Solomon testified that in August 1994, Foley told her a box fell on her at work and injured her. Although Solomon was a supervisor for DISD at the time, she was not Foley’s supervisor. DISD trained her on the procedure to follow when a worker reported a work related injury. When Foley told Solomon of the injury, she did not follow DISD’s procedure.

Appellant concedes that Solomon was a DISD supervisor, but contends because Solomon was not Foley’s supervisor, Solomon should be considered a “non-supervisor” for the purposes of Foley’s reporting an injury. Section 409.001 clearly permits an injured worker to notify a supervisor. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.001 (Vernon 1996). We conclude Foley gave DISD the notice required by section 409.001when she notified Solomon, a DISD supervisor, of her work-related injury within thirty days of the injury’s occurrence. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s point of error.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.